On 3/11/25 04:42, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> Add driver for the vTPM defined by the AMD SVSM spec [1].
>
> The specification defines a protocol that a SEV-SNP guest OS can use to
> discover and talk to a vTPM emulated by the Secure VM Service Module (SVSM)
> in the guest context, but at a more privileged level (VMPL0).
>
> The new tpm-svsm platform driver uses two functions exposed by x86/sev
> to verify that the device is actually emulated by the platform and to
> send commands and receive responses.
>
> The device cannot be hot-plugged/unplugged as it is emulated by the
> platform, so we can use module_platform_driver_probe(). The probe
> function will only check whether in the current runtime configuration,
> SVSM is present and provides a vTPM.
>
> This device does not support interrupts and sends responses to commands
> synchronously. In order to have .recv() called just after .send() in
> tpm_try_transmit(), the .status() callback returns 0, and both
> .req_complete_mask and .req_complete_val are set to 0.
>
> [1] "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests"
> Publication # 58019 Revision: 1.00
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> v3:
> - removed send_recv() ops and followed the ftpm driver implementing .status,
> .req_complete_mask, .req_complete_val, etc. [Jarkko]
> - removed link to the spec because those URLs are unstable [Borislav]
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 10 +++
> drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 159 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..5540d0227eed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
> + *
> + * Driver for the vTPM defined by the AMD SVSM spec [1].
> + *
> + * The specification defines a protocol that a SEV-SNP guest OS can use to
> + * discover and talk to a vTPM emulated by the Secure VM Service Module (SVSM)
> + * in the guest context, but at a more privileged level (usually VMPL0).
> + *
> + * [1] "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests"
> + * Publication # 58019 Revision: 1.00
> + */
> +
> +#include <asm/sev.h>
Typically the "asm" includes are after the "linux" includes and separated
from each other by a blank line.
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> +#include <linux/svsm_vtpm.h>
> +
> +#include "tpm.h"
> +
> +struct tpm_svsm_priv {
> + u8 buffer[SVSM_VTPM_MAX_BUFFER];
> + u8 locality;
> +};
I'm wondering if the buffer shouldn't be a pointer to a page of memory
that is a page allocation. This ensures it is always page-aligned in case
the tpm_svsm_priv structure is ever modified.
As it is, the kmalloc() allocation will be page-aligned because of the
size, but it might be safer, dunno, your call.
Thanks,
Tom
> +
> +static int tpm_svsm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct tpm_svsm_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = svsm_vtpm_fill_cmd_req((struct tpm_send_cmd_req *)priv->buffer,
> + priv->locality, buf, len);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * The SVSM call uses the same buffer for the command and for the
> + * response, so after this call, the buffer will contain the response
> + * that can be used by .recv() op.
> + */
> + return snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(priv->buffer);
> +}
> +
> +static int tpm_svsm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct tpm_svsm_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
> +
> + /*
> + * The internal buffer contains the response after we send the command
> + * to SVSM.
> + */
> + return svsm_vtpm_parse_cmd_resp((struct tpm_send_cmd_resp *)priv->buffer,
> + buf, len);
> +}
> +
> +static void tpm_svsm_cancel(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +{
> + /* not supported */
> +}
> +
> +static u8 tpm_svsm_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static bool tpm_svsm_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static struct tpm_class_ops tpm_chip_ops = {
> + .flags = TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP,
> + .recv = tpm_svsm_recv,
> + .send = tpm_svsm_send,
> + .cancel = tpm_svsm_cancel,
> + .status = tpm_svsm_status,
> + .req_complete_mask = 0,
> + .req_complete_val = 0,
> + .req_canceled = tpm_svsm_req_canceled,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init tpm_svsm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> +{
> + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
> + struct tpm_svsm_priv *priv;
> + struct tpm_chip *chip;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!snp_svsm_vtpm_probe())
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + priv = devm_kmalloc(dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!priv)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /*
> + * FIXME: before implementing locality we need to agree what it means
> + * for the SNP SVSM vTPM
> + */
> + priv->locality = 0;
> +
> + chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_chip_ops);
> + if (IS_ERR(chip))
> + return PTR_ERR(chip);
> +
> + dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
> +
> + err = tpm2_probe(chip);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + err = tpm_chip_register(chip);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + dev_info(dev, "SNP SVSM vTPM %s device\n",
> + (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) ? "2.0" : "1.2");
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void __exit tpm_svsm_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
> +{
> + struct tpm_chip *chip = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
> +
> + tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * tpm_svsm_remove() lives in .exit.text. For drivers registered via
> + * module_platform_driver_probe() this is ok because they cannot get unbound
> + * at runtime. So mark the driver struct with __refdata to prevent modpost
> + * triggering a section mismatch warning.
> + */
> +static struct platform_driver tpm_svsm_driver __refdata = {
> + .remove = __exit_p(tpm_svsm_remove),
> + .driver = {
> + .name = "tpm-svsm",
> + },
> +};
> +
> +module_platform_driver_probe(tpm_svsm_driver, tpm_svsm_probe);
> +
> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SNP SVSM vTPM Driver");
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> +MODULE_ALIAS("platform:tpm-svsm");
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> index 0fc9a510e059..fc3f1d10d31d 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> @@ -225,5 +225,15 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE
> help
> This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE.
>
> +config TCG_SVSM
> + tristate "SNP SVSM vTPM interface"
> + depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + help
> + This is a driver for the AMD SVSM vTPM protocol that a SEV-SNP guest
> + OS can use to discover and talk to a vTPM emulated by the Secure VM
> + Service Module (SVSM) in the guest context, but at a more privileged
> + level (usually VMPL0). To compile this driver as a module, choose M
> + here; the module will be called tpm_svsm.
> +
> source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig"
> endif # TCG_TPM
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
> index 9bb142c75243..52d9d80a0f56 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
> @@ -44,3 +44,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_XEN) += xen-tpmfront.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_CRB) += tpm_crb.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_VTPM_PROXY) += tpm_vtpm_proxy.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_FTPM_TEE) += tpm_ftpm_tee.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_SVSM) += tpm_svsm.o
