Re: [RFC][PATCH] ima: add measurement for first unverified write on ima policy file

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On Tue, 2025-02-25 at 20:53 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2025-02-25 at 14:12 +0100, Enrico Bravi wrote:
> > The first write on the ima policy file permits to override the default
> > policy defined with the ima_policy= boot parameter. This can be done
> > by adding the /etc/ima/ima-policy which allows loading the custom policy
> > during boot. It is also possible to load custom policy at runtime through
> > file operations:
> > 
> > cp custom_ima_policy /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > cat custom_ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > 
> > or by writing the absolute path of the file containing the custom policy:
> > 
> > echo /path/of/custom_ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > 
> > In these cases, file signature can be necessary to load the policy
> > (func=POLICY_CHECK). Custom policy can also be set at runtime by directly
> > writing the policy stream on the ima policy file:
> > 
> > echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
> >         "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
> >      > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > 
> > In this case, there is no mechanism to verify the integrity of the new
> > policy.
> > 
> > Add a new entry in the ima measurements list containing the ascii custom
> > ima policy buffer when not verified at load time.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@xxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Hi Enrico,

Hi Mimi,

thank you for the quick response.

> This patch set hard codes measuring the initial custom IMA policy rules that
> replace the builtin policies specified on the boot command line.  IMA
> shouldn't hard code policy.

My first approach was to define a new critical-data record, but performing the
measurement after the custom policy becomes effective, the measurement could be
bypassed omitting func=CRITICAL_DATA in the custom policy.

> I'm not quite sure why you're differentiating between
> measuring the initial and subsequent custom IMA policy rules.  

My intention is to measure the first direct write (line by line) on the policy
file, without loading the initial custom policy from a file. This case, if I'm
not wrong, is not covered by func=POLICY_CHECK.

> Consider defining a new critical-data record to measure the current IMA policy
> rules.  Also consider including the new critical-data rule in the arch
> specific policy rules.

I think that your suggestion, to add the critical-data rule in the arch policy
rules, solves the problems of bypassing the measurement and hard coding policy.

Thank you very much for your feedback.

Enrico

> thanks,
> 
> Mimi
> 





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