Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)

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On Tue, Jul 9, 2024 at 2:18 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 08, 2024 at 10:52:36AM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 10:33 AM Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > * Jeff Xu:
> > >
> > > > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 9:26 AM Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> * Jeff Xu:
> > > >>
> > > >> > Will dynamic linkers use the execveat(AT_CHECK) to check shared
> > > >> > libraries too ?  or just the main executable itself.
> > > >>
> > > >> I expect that dynamic linkers will have to do this for everything they
> > > >> map.
> > > > Then all the objects (.so, .sh, etc.) will go through  the check from
> > > > execveat's main  to security_bprm_creds_for_exec(), some of them might
> > > > be specific for the main executable ?
>
> Yes, we should check every executable code (including seccomp filters)
> to get a consistent policy.
>
> What do you mean by "specific for the main executable"?
>
I meant:

The check is for the exe itself, not .so, etc.

For example:  /usr/bin/touch is checked.
not the shared objects:
ldd /usr/bin/touch
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffdc988f000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f59b6757000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f59b6986000)

Basically, I asked if the check can be extended to shared-objects,
seccomp filters, etc, without modifying existing LSMs.
you pointed out "LSM should not need to be updated with this patch
series.", which already answered my question.

Thanks.
-Jeff

-Jeff





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