This is the last component of encrypted tpm2 session handling that
allows us to verify from userspace that the key derived from the NULL
seed genuinely belongs to the TPM and has not been spoofed.
The procedure for doing this involves creating an attestation identity
key (which requires verification of the TPM EK certificate) and then
using that AIK to sign a certification of the Elliptic Curve key over
the NULL seed. Userspace must create this EC Key using the parameters
prescribed in TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance for the SRK ECC; if
this is done correctly the names will match and the TPM can then run a
TPM2_Certify operation on this derived primary key using the newly
created AIK.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
v6: change config name
v7: add review
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index 54c71473aa29..94231f052ea7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -309,6 +309,21 @@ static ssize_t tpm_version_major_show(struct device *dev,
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tpm_version_major);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
+ int size = TPM2_NAME_SIZE;
+
+ bin2hex(buf, chip->null_key_name, size);
+ size *= 2;
+ buf[size++] = '\n';
+ return size;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(null_name);
+#endif
+
static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_pubek.attr,
&dev_attr_pcrs.attr,
@@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = {
static struct attribute *tpm2_dev_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_tpm_version_major.attr,
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+ &dev_attr_null_name.attr,
+#endif
NULL
};
--
2.35.3
