Re: [PATCH v6 14/20] tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append

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On Tue Jan 2, 2024 at 7:04 PM EET, James Bottomley wrote:
> Add tpm2_append_name() for appending to the handle area of the TPM
> command.  When TPM_BUS_SECURITY is enabled and HMAC sessions are in
> use this adds the standard u32 handle to the buffer but additionally
> records the name of the object which must be used as part of the HMAC
> computation.  The name of certain object types (volatile and permanent
> handles and NV indexes) is a hash of the public area of the object.
> Since this hash is not known ahead of time, it must be requested from
> the TPM using TPM2_ReadPublic() (which cannot be HMAC protected, but
> if an interposer lies about it, the HMAC check will fail and the
> problem will be detected).
>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> # crypto API parts
>
> ---
>
> v6: split into new patch, update config variable
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/tpm.h              |  26 +++++++
>  2 files changed, 147 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index bca6fe3ebb10..3fc43870792a 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
>   *	Under normal operation this function is done by
>   *	tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on
>   *	error legs where the latter is not executed.
> + * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer.  This must be
> + *	used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding
> + *	handles because handles have to be processed specially when
> + *	calculating the HMAC.  In particular, for NV, volatile and
> + *	permanent objects you now need to provide the name.
>   */
>  
>  #include "tpm.h"
> @@ -106,8 +111,26 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
>  		u8 scratch[AES_KEYBYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
>  	};
>  	u8 session_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +	/* 3 names of handles: name_h is handle, name is name of handle */
> +	u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
> +	u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
>  };
>  
> +/*
> + * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255)
> + */
> +static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
> +{
> +	static u8 size_map[] = {
> +		[TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +		[TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +		[TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +		[TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +	};
> +	u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name);
> +	return size_map[alg] + 2;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume
>   * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key
> @@ -281,6 +304,104 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   out:
>  	crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
>  }
> +
> +static int parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)

same nit about prefix as earlier

> +{
> +	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
> +	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> +	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
> +	u32 val;
> +
> +	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
> +	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> +
> +	/* skip public */
> +	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> +	if (val > tot_len)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	offset += val;
> +	/* name */
> +	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
> +	if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
> +	/* forget the rest */
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int tpm2_readpublic(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
> +{
> +	struct tpm_buf buf;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
> +	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
> +	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
> +		rc = parse_read_public(name, &buf);
> +
> +	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
> + * @chip: the TPM chip structure
> + * @buf: The buffer to be appended
> + * @handle: The handle to be appended
> + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
> + *
> + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
> + * objects pointed to by the handles.  For most objects, this is simly
> + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
> + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
> + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
> + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
> + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended.  For these
> + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this.  If a name is
> + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
> + * on the handle to obtain the name.
> + *
> + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
> + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
> + * kernel message.
> + */
> +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> +			 u32 handle, u8 *name)
> +{
> +	int slot;
> +	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
> +	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> +
> +	slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4;
> +	if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
> +		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
> +		return;
> +	}
> +	WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
> +	     "name added in wrong place\n");
> +	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> +	auth->session += 4;
> +
> +	if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
> +	    mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
> +	    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
> +		if (!name)
> +			tpm2_readpublic(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
> +	} else {
> +		if (name)
> +			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
> +	}
> +
> +	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
> +	if (name)
> +		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name);
>  /**
>   * tpm2_end_auth_session() - kill the allocated auth session
>   * @chip: the TPM chip structure
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index b83269bd851c..cb8e3625da89 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
>  	TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD	        = 0x0161,
>  	TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE	        = 0x0162,
>  	TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT	        = 0x0165,
> +	TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC		= 0x0173,
>  	TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS		= 0x0176,
>  	TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE        = 0x0177,
>  	TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY	        = 0x017A,
> @@ -288,6 +289,21 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
>  	TPM2_RS_PW		= 0x40000009,
>  };
>  
> +/* Most Significant Octet for key types  */
> +enum tpm2_mso_type {
> +	TPM2_MSO_NVRAM		= 0x01,
> +	TPM2_MSO_SESSION	= 0x02,
> +	TPM2_MSO_POLICY		= 0x03,
> +	TPM2_MSO_PERMANENT	= 0x40,
> +	TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE	= 0x80,
> +	TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT	= 0x81,
> +};
> +
> +static inline enum tpm2_mso_type tpm2_handle_mso(u32 handle)
> +{
> +	return handle >> 24;
> +}
> +
>  enum tpm2_capabilities {
>  	TPM2_CAP_HANDLES	= 1,
>  	TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS	= 2,
> @@ -472,6 +488,8 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
>  
>  int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> +			 u32 handle, u8 *name);
>  void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>  #else
>  static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> @@ -481,6 +499,14 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  {
>  }
> +static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> +				       struct tpm_buf *buf,
> +				       u32 handle, u8 *name)
> +{
> +	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> +	/* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */
> +	buf->handles++;
> +}
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
>  
>  #endif

Otherwise, looking pretty good

BR, Jarkko






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