On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 11:10 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 10:52 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 13:48 +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 21, 2023 at 07:24:23AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 06:32 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: > > > > > On Wed, 2023-09-20 at 17:52 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > > > > > On 9/20/2023 5:10 PM, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 9/20/23 18:09, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 9/20/23 17:16, Jeff Layton wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 2023-09-20 at 16:37 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 9/20/23 13:01, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 9/17/23 20:04, syzbot wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > syzbot has bisected this issue to: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > commit db1d1e8b9867aae5c3e61ad7859abfcc4a6fd6c7 > > > > > > > > > > > > Author: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > > > > > > > Date: Mon Apr 17 16:55:51 2023 +0000 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > bisection log: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=106f7e54680000 > > > > > > > > > > > > start commit: a747acc0b752 Merge tag > > > > > > > > > > > > 'linux-kselftest-next-6.6-rc2' > > > > > > > > > > > > of g.. > > > > > > > > > > > > git tree: upstream > > > > > > > > > > > > final oops: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=126f7e54680000 > > > > > > > > > > > > console output: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=146f7e54680000 > > > > > > > > > > > > kernel config: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=df91a3034fe3f122 > > > > > > > > > > > > dashboard link: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a67fc5321ffb4b311c98 > > > > > > > > > > > > syz repro: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1671b694680000 > > > > > > > > > > > > C reproducer: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14ec94d8680000 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Reported-by: syzbot+a67fc5321ffb4b311c98@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > > > > > > > > > Fixes: db1d1e8b9867 ("IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the > > > > > > > > > > > > i_version") > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For information about bisection process see: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection > > > > > > > > > > > The final oops shows this here: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 > > > > > > > > > > > #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode > > > > > > > > > > > #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page > > > > > > > > > > > PGD 0 P4D 0 > > > > > > > > > > > Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP > > > > > > > > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 3192 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted > > > > > > > > > > > 6.4.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 > > > > > > > > > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, > > > > > > > > > > > BIOS Google 08/04/2023 > > > > > > > > > > > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x35/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4946 > > > > > > > > > > > Code: 83 ec 18 65 4c 8b 35 aa 60 f4 7e 83 3d b7 11 e4 02 00 0f 84 05 > > > > > > > > > > > 02 00 00 4c 89 cb 89 cd 41 89 d5 49 89 ff 83 fe 01 77 0c 89 f0 > > > > > > > > > > > <49> 8b > > > > > > > > > > > 44 c7 08 48 85 c0 75 1b 4c 89 ff 31 d2 45 89 c4 e8 74 f6 ff > > > > > > > > > > > RSP: 0018:ffffc90002edb840 EFLAGS: 00010097 > > > > > > > > > > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002 > > > > > > > > > > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000050 > > > > > > > > > > > RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > > > > > > > > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 > > > > > > > > > > > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888102ea5340 R15: 0000000000000050 > > > > > > > > > > > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) > > > > > > > > > > > knlGS:0000000000000000 > > > > > > > > > > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > > > > > > > > > CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000003aa8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 > > > > > > > > > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > > > > > > > > > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > > > > > > > > > > Call Trace: > > > > > > > > > > > <TASK> > > > > > > > > > > > lock_acquire+0xd8/0x1f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5691 > > > > > > > > > > > seqcount_lockdep_reader_access include/linux/seqlock.h:102 [inline] > > > > > > > > > > > get_fs_root_rcu fs/d_path.c:243 [inline] > > > > > > > > > > > d_path+0xd1/0x1f0 fs/d_path.c:285 > > > > > > > > > > > audit_log_d_path+0x65/0x130 kernel/audit.c:2139 > > > > > > > > > > > dump_common_audit_data security/lsm_audit.c:224 [inline] > > > > > > > > > > > common_lsm_audit+0x3b3/0x840 security/lsm_audit.c:458 > > > > > > > > > > > smack_log+0xad/0x130 security/smack/smack_access.c:383 > > > > > > > > > > > smk_tskacc+0xb1/0xd0 security/smack/smack_access.c:253 > > > > > > > > > > > smack_inode_getattr+0x8a/0xb0 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1187 > > > > > > > > > > > security_inode_getattr+0x32/0x50 security/security.c:2114 > > > > > > > > > > > vfs_getattr+0x1b/0x40 fs/stat.c:167 > > > > > > > > > > > ovl_getattr+0xa6/0x3e0 fs/overlayfs/inode.c:173 > > > > > > > > > > > ima_check_last_writer security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:171 > > > > > > > > > > > [inline] > > > > > > > > > > > ima_file_free+0xbd/0x130 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:203 > > > > > > > > > > > __fput+0xc7/0x220 fs/file_table.c:315 > > > > > > > > > > > task_work_run+0x7d/0xa0 kernel/task_work.c:179 > > > > > > > > > > > exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] > > > > > > > > > > > do_exit+0x2c7/0xa80 kernel/exit.c:871 <----------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > do_group_exit+0x85/0xa0 kernel/exit.c:1021 > > > > > > > > > > > get_signal+0x73c/0x7f0 kernel/signal.c:2874 > > > > > > > > > > > arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x89/0x290 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 > > > > > > > > > > > exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x61/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:168 > > > > > > > > > > > exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x64/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:204 > > > > > > > > > > > __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] > > > > > > > > > > > syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x1d0 kernel/entry/common.c:297 > > > > > > > > > > > do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 > > > > > > > > > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > do_exit has called exit_fs(tsk) [ > > > > > > > > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.4-rc2/source/kernel/exit.c#L867 ] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > exit_fs(tsk) has set tsk->fs = NULL [ > > > > > > > > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.4-rc2/source/fs/fs_struct.c#L103 > > > > > > > > > > > ] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think this then bites in d_path() where it calls: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > get_fs_root_rcu(current->fs, &root); [ > > > > > > > > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.4-rc2/source/fs/d_path.c#L285 ] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > current->fs is likely NULL here. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If this was correct it would have nothing to do with the actual > > > > > > > > > > > patch, > > > > > > > > > > > though, but rather with the fact that smack logs on process > > > > > > > > > > > termination. I am not sure what the solution would be other than > > > > > > > > > > > testing for current->fs == NULL in d_path before using it and > > > > > > > > > > > returning an error that is not normally returned or trying to > > > > > > > > > > > intercept this case in smack. > > > > > > > > > > I have now been able to recreate the syzbot issue with the test > > > > > > > > > > program > > > > > > > > > > and the issue is exactly the one described here, current->fs == NULL. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Earlier in this thread, Amir had a diagnosis that IMA is > > > > > > > > > inappropriately > > > > > > > > > trying to use f_path directly instead of using the helpers that are > > > > > > > > > friendly for stacking filesystems. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAOQ4uxgjnYyeQL-LbS5kQ7+C0d6sjzKqMDWAtZW8cAkPaed6=Q@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm not an IMA hacker so I'm not planning to roll a fix here. Perhaps > > > > > > > > > someone on the IMA team could try this approach? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I have applied this patch here from Amir now and it does NOT resolve > > > > > > > > the issue: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/296dae962a2a488bde682d3def074db91686e1c3.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/T/#m4ebdb780bf6952e7f210c55e87950d0cfa1d5eb0 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This seems to resolve the issue: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c > > > > > > > b/security/smack/smack_access.c > > > > > > > index 585e5e35710b..57afcea1e39b 100644 > > > > > > > --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c > > > > > > > +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c > > > > > > > @@ -347,6 +347,9 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char > > > > > > > *object_label, int request, > > > > > > > struct smack_audit_data *sad; > > > > > > > struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + if (current->flags & PF_EXITING) > > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > Based on what I see here I can understand that this prevents the panic, > > > > > > but it isn't so clear what changed that introduced the problem. > > > > > > > > > > > > > /* check if we have to log the current event */ > > > > > > > if (result < 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0) > > > > > > > return; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Apparently, it's this patch: > > > > > > > > > > db1d1e8b9867 IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version > > > > > > > > Yes, the syzbot was updated with that info. > > > > > > > > > At one time, IMA would reach directly into the inode to get the > > > > > i_version and ctime. That was fine for certain filesystems, but with > > > > > more recent changes it needs to go through ->getattr instead. Evidently, > > > > > it's selecting the wrong inode to query when dealing with overlayfs and > > > > > that's causing panics at times. > > > > > > > > > > As to why the above patch helps, I'm not sure, but given that it doesn't > > > > > seem to change which inode is being queried via getattr, it seems like > > > > > this is probably papering over the real bug. That said, IMA and > > > > > overlayfs are not really in my wheelhouse, so I could be very wrong > > > > > here. > > > > > > > > The call to vfs_getattr_nosec() somehow triggers a call to > > > > security_inode_getattr(). Without the call neither ovl_getattr() nor > > > > smack_inode_getattr() would be called. > > > > > > ima_file_free() > > > -> ima_check_last_writer() > > > -> vfs_getattr_nosec() > > > -> i_op->getattr() == ovl_getattr() > > > -> vfs_getattr() > > > -> security_inode_getattr() > > > -> real_i_op->getattr() > > > > > > is the callchain that triggers this. > > > > Thank you for the explanation as to why ovl_getattr() and subsequently > > smack_inode_getattr() is being called. > > > > > > > > ima_file_free() is called in a very sensitive location: __fput() that > > > can be called from task work when the process is already PF_EXITING. > > > > > > The ideal solution would be for ima to stop calling back into the > > > filesystems in this location at all but that's probably not going to > > > happen because I now realize you also set extended attributes from > > > __fput(): > > > > > > > > > ima_check_last_writer() > > > -> ima_update_xatt() > > > -> ima_fix_xattr() > > > -> __vfs_setxattr_noperm() > > > > > > The __vfs_setxattr_noperm() codepath can itself trigger > > > security_inode_post_setxattr() and security_inode_setsecurity(). So > > > those hooks are hopefully safe to be called with PF_EXITING tasks as > > > well... > > > > > > Imho, this is all very wild but I'm not judging. > > > > Measuring and verifying immutable files is straight forward. > > Measuring, verifiying, and updating mutable file hashes is a lot more > > complicated. Re-calculating the file hash everytime the file changes > > would impact performance. The file hash is currently updated as the > > last writer closes the file (__fput). One of the reasons for the wq > > was for IMA to safely calculate the file hash and and take the i_mutex > > to write the xattr. > > > > IMA support for mutable files makes IMA a lot more complicated. Any > > improvement suggestions would be appreciated. > > > > > > > > Two solutions imho: > > > (1) teach stacking filesystems like overlayfs and ecryptfs to use > > > vfs_getattr_nosec() in their ->getattr() implementation when they > > > are themselves called via vfs_getattr_nosec(). This will fix this by > > > not triggering another LSM hook. > > > (2) make all ->getattr() LSM hooks PF_EXITING safe ideally don't do > > > anything > > > > The original problem was detecting i_version change on overlayfs. > > > > Amir's proposed patch might resolve it without commit db1d1e8b9867 > > ("IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version"). However, as Amir > > said, it does not address the new problem introduced by it. Assuming > > Amir's proposed patch resolves the original problem, an alternative > > solution would be to revert commit db1d1e8b9867. > > > > If you're going to revert that commit, then I'm wondering what you > intend to do instead. Reaching directly into the inode to get this > information is really no bueno. IMA detecting file change based on i_version has been there since IMA was upstreamed. Please explain why this is not a good idea. Mimi
