On Sat Sep 9, 2023 at 12:34 AM EEST, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Currently root can dynamically update the blacklist keyring if the hash
> being added is signed and vouched for by the builtin trusted keyring.
> Currently keys in the secondary trusted keyring can not be used.
>
> Keys within the secondary trusted keyring carry the same capabilities as
> the builtin trusted keyring. Relax the current restriction for updating
> the .blacklist keyring and allow the secondary to also be referenced as
> a trust source. Since the machine keyring is linked to the secondary
> trusted keyring, any key within it may also be used.
>
> An example use case for this is IMA appraisal. Now that IMA both
> references the blacklist keyring and allows the machine owner to add
> custom IMA CA certs via the machine keyring, this adds the additional
> capability for the machine owner to also do revocations on a running
> system.
>
> IMA appraisal usage example to add a revocation for /usr/foo:
>
> sha256sum /bin/foo | awk '{printf "bin:" $1}' > hash.txt
>
> openssl smime -sign -in hash.txt -inkey machine-private-key.pem \
> -signer machine-certificate.pem -noattr -binary -outform DER \
> -out hash.p7s
>
> keyctl padd blacklist "$(< hash.txt)" %:.blacklist < hash.p7s
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> certs/Kconfig | 2 +-
> certs/blacklist.c | 4 ++--
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
> index 1f109b070877..23dc87c52aff 100644
> --- a/certs/Kconfig
> +++ b/certs/Kconfig
> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
> depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
> help
> If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if
> - they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted
> + they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the secondary trusted
> keyring. The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key
> payload. Blacklist keys cannot be removed.
>
> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
> index 675dd7a8f07a..0b346048ae2d 100644
> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
> @@ -102,12 +102,12 @@ static int blacklist_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
> /*
> - * Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin
> + * Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the secondary
> * trusted keyring.
> */
> err = verify_pkcs7_signature(key->description,
> strlen(key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen,
> - NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
> + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
> if (err)
> return err;
> #else
> --
> 2.39.3
What if a live system in the wild assumes the old policy? I feel that
this is "sort of" breaking backwards compatibility but please prove me
wrong.
BR, Jarkko
