On 8/30/23 11:12, Ken Goldman wrote:
On 8/1/2023 3:12 PM, Sush Shringarputale wrote:
- A user-mode process will trigger the snapshot by opening a file in
SysFS
say /sys/kernel/security/ima/snapshot (referred to as
sysk_ima_snapshot_file
here onwards).
- The Kernel will get the current TPM PCR values and PCR update
counter [2]
and store them as template data in a new IMA event
"snapshot_aggregate".
If this is relying on a user-mode process, is there a concern that the
process doesn't run. Might it be safer to have the kernel trigger the
snapshot.
The UM process here would be typically an attestation client
which passes on the IMA log to the remote service for attestation.
If the process doesn't run, the client will operate the same way as it
does currently.
Kernel triggering snapshot would come with its own issues of Kernel
storing the snapshot on some persistent file-system. They are being
discussed on the main thread [1].
PCR reads are not atomic, with each other and with event log appends. Is
this an issue?
In this design, reading the PCR plus adding the snapshot_aggregate
has to be an atomic operation. Other IMA events shouldn't interfere
with this operation. Just like IMA ensures adding an entry to the log
plus PCR extension happens in an atomic way by holding the
ima_extend_list_mutex [2], we intend to use a similar mechanism to
ensure reading the PCR plus adding the snapshot_aggregate remains an
atomic operation. And since taking a snapshot would be a rare event
compared to adding a generic event to IMA log - overall we expect a low
overhead in case of snapshotting.
However, please note that the event addition to IMA logs will *not*
be paused while the log is written out to disk by the UM process.
The PCR update counter can change between PCR reads. What is its purpose?
Earlier we believed the PCR update counter will help with keeping track
of events in the IMA log snapshot. But I soon realized (and it was
also pointed out by Stefan Berger on the PCR update counter patch-series
[3]) that the update counter gets incremented on updates to any PCR
(including the PCRs not touched by IMA).
I agree that update counter may not be a reliable marker for this
particular feature.
We have put that series [3] on hold for other higher priority work items
in the IMA/kexec space.
What is the purpose of the snapshot aggregate? Since the entire event
log has to be retained and sent to the verifier, is the aggregate
redundant?
The goals of snapshot_aggregate marker are:
1. To allow the IMA log to be divided into multiple chunks and
provide attestation service the ability to verify and use the
latest chunk (i.e. snapshot ) for attestation.
2. To indicate to the attestation service that the client device has
IMA log snapshotting feature enabled, and at least one snapshot
is taken. So that the service can ask for previous snapshots
as needed.
3. In the event of multiple snapshots, the snapshot_aggregate
marker has sufficient information to verify the integrity
of latest subset of isolated snapshots (with the help of PCR
quote of course)
4. snapshot_aggregate helps both kernel and UM define clear
boundaries between multiple snapshots.
(each new snapshot starts with either the first boot_aggregate
or a snapshot_aggregate event)
The overall goals of IMA log snapshotting feature are:
a. to relieve memory pressure on the client device.
b. to make attestation service side processing more efficient
They don't have to deal with the entire log since boot,
as you mentioned on
c. Reduce network bandwidth usage by sending less data
for each attestation request.
We missed stating them explicitly in the original RFC proposal we
sent. We will add them in the next version of the proposal.
References:
[1] Re: [RFC] IMA Log Snapshotting Design Proposal - Paul Moore
(kernel.org)
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHC9VhQbnyd2nvmL-t=3kXppsm985ps+NPJ5QDvM1WSS-Hd_Ew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
[2] ima_extend_list_mutex
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c#L159
[3] Re: [PATCH 0/6] Measuring TPM update counter in IMA - Stefan Berger
(kernel.org)
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/a4a5e40b-abc1-27fa-3984-cee18fb4522c@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Thanks,
