From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx> A bit of history first. The original name of this work was IMA Digest Lists, which was somehow considered too invasive. I then moved the code to a separate component named DIGLIM (DIGest Lists Integrity Module), with the purpose of removing the complexity away of IMA, and also add the possibility of using it with other kernel components (e.g. Integrity Policy Enforcement, or IPE). Since it was originally proposed, in 2017, this work grew up a lot thanks to the feedback of my colleagues and external reviewers. It became integrally part of the openEuler distribution since end of 2020. The upstreaming process has been difficult, also due to the fact too many features were included in the proposals. So, I decided to take a step back and find the minimum possible set of features that would make this work meaningful. The really minimum set that would make appraisal work is to parse the RPM header (after signature verification) containing the reference digests and compare the calculated file digest with them. That would be similar to reading the signature from the xattr and verifying the digest. But, maybe that was too minimal. It does not make sense to appraise and parse again the same RPM header for another packaged files. And should not be necessarily tied to appraisal, as it would be useful for measurement too (to make a PCR predictable). Please read the Benefits section here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210914163401.864635-1-roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx/ So, this is how the integrity digest cache is born. The main difference with the previous attempts is that there is not a centralized place to store file/metadata digests, but they are stored in the digest cache, attached to the file (the digest list) the digest cache was created from. The link with the files being measured/appraised is the new security.digest_list xattr containing the full path of the digest list they refer to. At the time there is a measurement/appraisal, the digest cache is built by reading (after appraisal) and parsing the digest list (a TLV format and the RPM package format are currently supported). Extracted digests are added to a per-package hash table, sized depending on the number of elements. Lookup should be much faster, as we are not anymore searching in a hash table with 80000 digests, but most of the time with 100 or less. Also, there is no need for locking after creation, the digest cache does not change depending on writes (it would not make sense, since digest lists are signed). Another very important feature is that the digest cache is reclaimable, i.e. it disappears if the inode is evicted from memory. In that case, the digest cache need to be initialized again. The digest cache does not disappear while IMA is using it, by acquiring and releasing a reference to the path structure of the digest list. What about the predictability of PCRs, that some folks are trying to address with the Unified Kernel Image? The concept of digest lists is quite simple: measure the digest list to represent the possible access of a group of files, instead of recording individual file accesses. If digest lists are measured in a deterministic way, the PCR remains predictable despite files are accessed in a different order. We currently don't support xattrs in the initial ram disk, but if we did and the initial ram disk uses the same measured files as the root filesystem, the PCR would still remain predictable. Another important point of the design was to avoid any possible interference with existing IMA measurement and appraisal behavior. This has been achieved in the following way. First, the digest cache needs to be explicitly enabled in the IMA policy through the new policy keyword 'digest_cache=content'. Second, new-style measurements cannot be done on the default IMA PCR, a policy writer must specify a different PCR or the policy will be rejected. Also, the use of the digest cache is incompatible with other appraisal methods, e.g. with xattrs or a modsig. The policy writer cannot specify any of the other methods if it includes the digest_cache directive. Finally, the digest cache does not bypass EVM too. Files matched with the digest caches can only be opened read-only, to prevent updating an unverified HMAC to a valid one. Another incorrect policy combination is forbidden. The use of the digest_cache directive alone does not enable the new behavior. The action for which the digest cache should be used should have also be done on the digest list itself. Otherwise, one cannot explain why there are no measurements (if the digest list was not measured for example). The same applies for appraisal. The last part I wanted to talk about is about the digest list parsers. This was a long debate. In the original proposal, Matthew Garrett and Christoph Hellwig said that adding parsers in the kernel is not scalable and not a good idea in general. While I do agree with them, I'm also thinking what benefits we get if we relax a bit this requirement. If we merge this patch set and the dependency (user asymmetric keys and signatures) today, we are immediately able to have a predictable PCR for measurement, and do appraisal at least of executable code without additional support from the Linux distributions. We would need a small rpm plugin to write/remove RPM headers and their signature to/from the disk as soon as packages are installed/removed. Over the years, I have tried many alternatives to the kernel-based parsers. In the very first version, we supported only one digest list format in the kernel, and injected the digest list to each package at build time. While it works, it is still one way to do that, others don't support it and it is building infrastructure-dependent. I have tried to do the conversion from the RPM format to the kernel format in user space, with the idea that the process doing it could be isolated against an untrusted root. I had a recent discussion with the security folks and they don't seem excited about it. I have fully implemented DIGLIM and PGP keys and signatures support in eBPF. The idea itself of being able to add kernel functionality in a safe way without touching the kernel is very nice, and I would have pursued it more. However, after I found LSM policy bypass and other bugs and after my patches were not accepted by the maintainers, I didn't really feel I could rely on this subsystem. So, back to the original approach for now, maintainers seem to be more incline to accept kernel code, if there is a need for strong isolation. In the future, we might work on better alternative. This patch set depends on: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20230720153247.3755856-2-roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ which allows to appraise RPM package headers with the PGP keys of Linux distribution vendors. Patch 1 introduces a new hook to identify the loading of digest lists and consequently appraise them. Patches 2-4 implement the digest cache, and an iterator to prefetch the digest lists to measure them in a deterministic way. Patches 5-6 implement the currently supported digest list formats: tlv and rpm. The tlv format relies on the TLV parser defined in the patch set mentioned above. Patches 7-9 enable the usage of the digest cache in IMA for measurement and appraisal. Patches 10-12 add a tool to manage digest lists. If you are curious to try on an existing system, you first need to build gpg with the patches in the previous patch set, and convert the PGP keys of your Linux distribution to the new user asymmetric key format: $ gpg --conv-kernel <path of PGP key> >> certs/uasym_keys.bin This embeds the converted keys in the kernel image. Then, enable the following kernel options: CONFIG_INTEGRITY_DIGEST_CACHE=y CONFIG_UASYM_KEYS_SIGS=y CONFIG_UASYM_PRELOAD_PUBLIC_KEYS=y and rebuild the kernel with the patches applied. After boot, build and install the digest list tool in tools/digest-lists, and execute: $ manage_digest_lists -o gen -d /etc/digest_lists -i rpmdb -f rpm You also need the new gpg when you execute this tool, to convert the PGP signatures of the RPM headers to the user asymmetric key format. You may want to add the following additional files in a digest list by creating a file named 'list' with the content: /usr/bin/manage_digest_lists /usr/lib64/libgen-tlv-list.so /usr/lib64/libgen-rpm-list.so /usr/lib64/libparse-rpm-list.so /usr/lib64/libparse-tlv-list.so and, execute: $ manage_digest_lists -i list -L -d /etc/digest_lists -o gen -f tlv You need to sign the created file: scripts/sign-file sha256 certs/signing_key.pem certs/signing_key.pem /etc/digest_lists/tlv-list The final step is to add security.digest_list to each file with: $ manage_digest_lists -i /etc/digest_lists -o add-xattr After that, create the following policy in /etc/ima/ima-policy: dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994 appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_cache=content appraise func=MMAP_CHECK digest_cache=content appraise func=DIGEST_LIST_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig measure func=DIGEST_LIST_CHECK template=ima-modsig pcr=11 measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_cache=content pcr=11 measure func=MMAP_CHECK digest_cache=content pcr=11 I'm excluding tmpfs for now, we need to deal with memfd. Before loading the policy, you could enable the dynamic debug with: $ echo "file tlv* +p" > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control $ echo "file rpm* +p" > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control $ echo "file digest* +p" > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control Or add the same strings with the dyndbg= option in the kernel command line. Then, just cat the policy to IMA: $ cat /etc/ima/ima-policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy If that worked, you can reboot the system. Systemd will take care of loading the IMA policy at boot. Everything works for me on Fedora 38. You can check the content of the measurement list: $ cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements You will see only the measurement of the digest lists, not of the other files. If you try: $ cp -a /bin/cat . $ ./cat That will work. But if you do: $ echo 1 >> cat $ cat -bash: ./cat: Permission denied Execution will be denied, and you will see a new entry in the measurement list (honestly, it should not be there, as access to the file was denied): 11 50b5a68bea0776a84eef6725f17ce474756e51c0 ima-ng sha256:15e1efee080fe54f5d7404af7e913de01671e745ce55215d89f3d6521d3884f0 /root/cat Finally, you could try to evict inodes from memory, to free the digest cache: $ echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches You will see in the kernel logs messages like: [ 313.032536] DIGEST CACHE: Remove digest sha256:102900208eef27b766380135906d431dba87edaa7ec6aa72e6ebd3dd67f3a97b from digest list /etc/digest_lists/rpm-libseccomp-2.5.3-4.fc38.x86_64 Roberto Sassu (12): ima: Introduce hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK integrity: Introduce a digest cache integrity/digest_cache: Add functions to populate and search integrity/digest_cache: Iterate over digest lists in same dir integrity/digest_cache: Parse tlv digest lists integrity/digest_cache: Parse rpm digest lists ima: Add digest_cache policy keyword ima: Use digest cache for measurement ima: Use digest cache for appraisal tools: Add tool to manage digest lists tools/digest-lists: Add tlv digest list generator and parser tools/digest-lists: Add rpm digest list generator and parser Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +- MAINTAINERS | 1 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tlv_digest_list.h | 59 +++ include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 3 + security/integrity/Kconfig | 12 + security/integrity/Makefile | 4 + security/integrity/digest_cache.c | 430 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/digest_cache.h | 113 +++++ security/integrity/digest_cache_iter.c | 163 +++++++ .../integrity/digest_list_parsers/parsers.h | 15 + security/integrity/digest_list_parsers/rpm.c | 174 +++++++ security/integrity/digest_list_parsers/tlv.c | 188 ++++++++ security/integrity/iint.c | 7 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 17 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 22 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 54 ++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 + tools/Makefile | 16 +- tools/digest-lists/.gitignore | 7 + tools/digest-lists/Makefile | 72 +++ tools/digest-lists/common.c | 163 +++++++ tools/digest-lists/common.h | 90 ++++ tools/digest-lists/generators/generators.h | 18 + tools/digest-lists/generators/rpm.c | 257 +++++++++++ tools/digest-lists/generators/tlv.c | 168 +++++++ tools/digest-lists/manage_digest_lists.c | 349 ++++++++++++++ tools/digest-lists/manage_digest_lists.txt | 82 ++++ tools/digest-lists/parsers/parsers.h | 16 + tools/digest-lists/parsers/rpm.c | 169 +++++++ tools/digest-lists/parsers/tlv.c | 195 ++++++++ tools/digest-lists/parsers/tlv_parser.h | 38 ++ 34 files changed, 2942 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/tlv_digest_list.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/digest_cache.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/digest_cache.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/digest_cache_iter.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/digest_list_parsers/parsers.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/digest_list_parsers/rpm.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/digest_list_parsers/tlv.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/common.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/common.h create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/generators/generators.h create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/generators/rpm.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/generators/tlv.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/manage_digest_lists.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/manage_digest_lists.txt create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/parsers/parsers.h create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/parsers/rpm.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/parsers/tlv.c create mode 100644 tools/digest-lists/parsers/tlv_parser.h -- 2.34.1
