On Wed, 2023-07-12 at 21:12 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote: > > > On Jul 12, 2023, at 11:40 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Wed, 2023-07-05 at 18:52 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: > >> Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with > >> modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist > >> keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature > >> validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures. > >> > >> An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do > >> revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the > >> revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now > >> enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been > >> deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only > >> authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be > >> achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal. > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Thanks, Eric. Other than including "appraise_flag=check_blacklist" > > when displaying the measurement list, it looks good. > > Thanks for your review. > > I want to make sure I understand the request here. Do you mean you > don’t want to see “appraise_flag=check_blacklist” when you cat > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy? Or are you referencing a change in the > /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements list? Thanks. The IMA policy rules as displayed via <securityfs>/ima/policy should not contain “appraise_flag=check_blacklist". -- thanks, Mimi