If some entity is snooping the TPM bus, they can see the random
numbers we're extracting from the TPM and do prediction attacks
against their consumers. Foil this attack by using response
encryption to prevent the attacker from seeing the random sequence.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index ef038cc71f9c..dc0070922d38 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -292,25 +292,35 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
return -EINVAL;
- err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
+ err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (err)
return err;
+ err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
+ if (err) {
+ tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+ return err;
+ }
+
do {
- tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
+ tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT
+ | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
+ NULL, 0);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
buffer),
"attempting get random");
+ err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, err);
if (err) {
if (err > 0)
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
- out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)
- &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)tpm_buf_parameters(&buf);
recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes);
if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) <
TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
@@ -327,6 +337,8 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
} while (retries-- && total < max);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+
return total ? total : -EIO;
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
--
2.35.3
