On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:18:58AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 08:39:58AM +0200, Nikolaus Voss wrote: > > Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided > > decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. > > The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. > > Fix this to use hex2bin instead. > > > > Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" > > are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the > > old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a > > small shell script, e.g.: > > > > BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa > > NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32) > > keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u > > keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u > > > > It is encouraged to switch to a new key because the effective key size > > of the old keys is only half of the specified size. > > > > The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been > > fixed (see link below). > > > > Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") > > Cc: stable <stable@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Changes > > ======= > > v4: - fixed link > > v3: - use generated random key in example, reformat commit message > > v2: - clarify commit message, add example to recover old/broken keys > > - improve example in Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > - add link to ltp patch > > > > Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 3 ++- > > security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 6 +++--- > > 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > index 0bfb4c339748..9bc9db8ec651 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > @@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: > > > > Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data:: > > > > - $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u > > + $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p) > > + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u > > 794890253 > > > > $ keyctl print 794890253 > > diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c > > index e05cfc2e49ae..1e313982af02 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c > > +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c > > @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, > > pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n"); > > return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > > } > > - if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) { > > + if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen * 2) { > > pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n"); > > return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > > } > > @@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, > > ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv); > > } else if (decrypted_data) { > > get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize); > > - memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, > > - epayload->decrypted_datalen); > > + ret = hex2bin(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, > > + epayload->decrypted_datalen); > > } else { > > get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize); > > get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen); > > -- > > 2.34.1 > > > > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Unless there is opposing views, I can pick this. Actually, taking this back: please fix the checkpatch warnings first. BR, Jarkko