On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 04:45:41PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Wed, 2022-10-19 at 11:59 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 10:34:48AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Thu, 2022-10-13 at 15:36 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > > > This moves the trivial hard-coded stacking of IMA LSM hooks into the > > > > existing LSM infrastructure. > > > > > > The only thing trivial about making IMA and EVM LSMs is moving them to > > > LSM hooks. Although static files may be signed and the signatures > > > distributed with the file data through the normal distribution > > > mechanisms (e.g. RPM), other files cannot be signed remotely (e.g. > > > configuration files). For these files, both IMA and EVM may be > > > configured to maintain persistent file state stored as security xattrs > > > in the form of security.ima file hashes or security.evm HMACs. The LSM > > > flexibility of enabling/disabling IMA or EVM on a per boot basis breaks > > > this usage, potentially preventing subsequent boots. > > > > I'm not suggesting IMA and EVM don't have specific behaviors that need to > > be correctly integrated into the LSM infrastructure. In fact, I spent a > > lot of time designing that infrastructure to be flexible enough to deal > > with these kinds of things. (e.g. plumbing "enablement", etc.) As I > > mentioned, this was more of trying to provide a head-start on the > > conversion. I don't intend to drive this -- please take whatever is > > useful from this example and use it. :) I'm happy to help construct any > > missing infrastructure needed (e.g. LSM_ORDER_LAST, etc). > > > > As for preventing subsequent boots, this is already true with other LSMs > > that save state that affects system behavior (like SELinux tags, AppArmor > > policy). IMA and EVM are not special in that regard conceptually. > > > Besides, it also looks like it's already possible to boot with IMA or EVM > > disabled ("ima_appraise=off", or "evm=fix"), so there's no regression > > conceptually for having "integrity" get dropped from the lsm= list at > > boot. And if you want it not to be silent disabling, that's fine -- > > just panic during initialization if "integrity" is disabled, as is > > already happening. > > Being able to specify "ima_appraise=" on the boot command line requires > IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM to be configured. Even when specified, if the > system is booted with secure-boot mode enabled, it also cannot be > modified. With the ability of randomly enabling/disabling LSMs, these > protections are useless. Sure, so let's get lsm= added to the lockdown list, etc. My point is for us to work through each of these concerns and address them. I am not an IMA/EVM expert, but I do understand the LSM infrastructure deeply, so I'd like to help you get these changes made. -- Kees Cook