Hi Nikolaus,
On Wed, 2022-10-19 at 16:07 +0200, Nikolaus Voss wrote:
> Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided
> decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data.
> The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer.
> Fix this to use hex2bin instead.
>
> Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe"
> are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the
> old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a
> small shell script, e.g.:
>
> BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa
> NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
> keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u
> keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u
>
> However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a
> brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most
> 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
>
> The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range
> to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could have been fixed
> either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and doubling the ascii
> input key length). This patch implements the latter.
>
> The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been
> fixed (see link below).
>
> Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
> Cc: stable <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
While preparing to queue this patch, I noticed scripts/checkpatch.pl
returns a couple of warnings, including that the sender email address
and your tag here don't match. Wish I had caught them earlier.
--
thanks,
Mimi
