Re: [PATCH v12 02/26] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 





On 5/20/22 22:23, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:06:09AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
Enable multiple instances of securityfs by keying each instance with a
pointer to the user namespace it belongs to.

Since we do not need the pinning of the filesystem for the virtualization
case, limit the usage of simple_pin_fs() and simpe_release_fs() to the
case when the init_user_ns is active. This simplifies the cleanup for the
virtualization case where usage of securityfs_remove() to free dentries
is therefore not needed anymore.

For the initial securityfs, i.e. the one mounted in the host userns mount,
nothing changes. The rules for securityfs_remove() are as before and it is
still paired with securityfs_create(). Specifically, a file created via
securityfs_create_dentry() in the initial securityfs mount still needs to
be removed by a call to securityfs_remove(). Creating a new dentry in the
initial securityfs mount still pins the filesystem like it always did.
Consequently, the initial securityfs mount is not destroyed on
umount/shutdown as long as at least one user of it still has dentries that
it hasn't removed with a call to securityfs_remove().

Prevent mounting of an instance of securityfs in another user namespace
than it belongs to. Also, prevent accesses to files and directories by
a user namespace that is neither the user namespace it belongs to
nor an ancestor of the user namespace that the instance of securityfs
belongs to. Do not prevent access if securityfs was bind-mounted and
therefore the init_user_ns is the owning user namespace.

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
v11:
  - Formatted comment's first line to be '/*'
---
  security/inode.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
  1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 13e6780c4444..84c9396792a9 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -21,9 +21,38 @@
  #include <linux/security.h>
  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
-static struct vfsmount *mount;
-static int mount_count;
+static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
+static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
+
+static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				 struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
+	if (!err) {
+		/*
+		 * Unless bind-mounted, deny access if current_user_ns() is not
+		 * ancestor.

This comment has confused me the last few times I looked at this.  I see
now you're using "bind-mounted" as a shortcut for saying "bind mounted from
the init_user_ns into a child_user_ns container".  I do think that needs
to be made clearer in this comment.


I rephrased the comment now.

   Stefan



[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[Index of Archives]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux Kernel Hardening]     [Linux NFS]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux