Hi Mimi,
>
> This patch set could probably go through KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY, but
> it's kind of late to be asking. Has it been in linux-next? Should I
> assume this patch set has been fully tested or can we get some "tags"?
[...]
IIRC, Coiby has tested it on x86_64/arm64, not sure if he took test on
s390. No, this hasn't been in linux-next.
For arm64, recently I did a new round of test and the patches works as
expected,
1. Build 5.19.0-rc2
2. generate keys and add them to .secondary_trusted_keys, MOK, UEFI
db;
3. sign different kernel images with different keys including keys
from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys keyring, UEFI db
key and MOK key
4. Without lockdown, all kernel images can be kexec'ed; with lockdown
enabled, only the kernel image signed by the key from
.builtin_trusted_key can be kexec'ed
Then I build a new kernel with the patches applied and confirm all
kernel images can be kexec'ed.
I used the s390 code on powerpc and there it did not work because the
built-in key was needed to verify the kernel.
I did not really run this on s390, only ported the fix I needed on
powerpc back to s390.
For 390, I commented out the code that skips signature verification
when secure boot is not enabled since I couldn't find a machine that
supports secure boot and confirm before applying the patch, kernel
images signed by keys from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys
couldn't be kexec'ed when lockdown is enabled; after applying the
patch, those kernel images could be kexec'ed.
Thanks
Michal
--
Best regards,
Coiby
