On 3/18/22 14:21, Mimi Zohar wrote:
IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the 'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data - hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature. In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new signature version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest.
Would it not be enough to just differentiat by the type of signature rather than also bumping the version? It's still signature_v2_hdr but a new type IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG is introduced there that shoud be sufficient to indicate that a different method for calculating the hash is to be used than for anything that existed before? sigv3 would then become the more obvious veriftysig... ?
