On Wed, Dec 08, 2021 at 01:58:14PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote: > On Tue, Dec 07, 2021 at 03:21:27PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > > Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA > > namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the > > host is also created for the namespacing case. > > > > The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the > > IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file > > system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super. > > > > This filesystem can now be mounted as follows: > > > > mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/ > > > > The following directories, symlinks, and files are then available. > > > > $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ > > total 0 > > lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima > > drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 integrity > > > > $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/ > > total 0 > > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements > > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements > > -rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 policy > > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count > > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 violations > > > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > include/linux/ima.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++- > > security/inode.c | 12 +++++++++++- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- > > 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > > index bfb978a7f8d5..a8017272d78d 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > > @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) > > } > > #endif > > > > +extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, > > + struct dentry *root); > > +extern void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct user_namespace *user_ns); > > + > > #else > > static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void) > > { > > @@ -154,6 +158,15 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, > > return -ENOENT; > > } > > > > +static inline int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *ns, struct dentry *root) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +static inline void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct user_namespace *user_ns) > > +{ > > +} > > + > > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ > > > > #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC > > @@ -221,7 +234,8 @@ struct ima_h_table { > > }; > > > > enum { > > - IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR = 0, > > + IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR = 0, > > + IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR, > > IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK, > > IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS, > > IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS, > > @@ -333,6 +347,7 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) > > { > > return &init_ima_ns; > > } > > + > > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ > > > > #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) > > diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c > > index 121ac1874dde..10ee20917f42 100644 > > --- a/security/inode.c > > +++ b/security/inode.c > > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ > > #include <linux/fs_context.h> > > #include <linux/mount.h> > > #include <linux/pagemap.h> > > +#include <linux/ima.h> > > #include <linux/init.h> > > #include <linux/namei.h> > > #include <linux/security.h> > > @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = { > > static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) > > { > > static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}}; > > + struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns; > > int error; > > > > error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files); > > @@ -49,7 +51,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) > > > > sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations; > > > > - return 0; > > + if (ns != &init_user_ns) > > + error = ima_fs_ns_init(ns, sb->s_root); > > + > > + return error; > > } > > > > static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) > > @@ -69,6 +74,11 @@ static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) > > > > static void securityfs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb) > > { > > + struct user_namespace *ns = sb->s_fs_info; > > + > > + if (ns != &init_user_ns) > > + ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(ns); > > Say securityfs is unmounted. Then all the inodes and dentries become > invalid. It's not allowed to hold on to any dentries or inodes after the > super_block is shut down. So I just want to be sure that nothing in ima > can access these dentries after securityfs is unmounted. > > To put it another way: why are they stored in struct ima_namespace in > the first place? If you don't pin a filesystem when creating files or > directories like you do for securityfs in init_ima_ns then you don't > need to hold on to them as they will be automatically be wiped during > umount. The way I see it you need to do the following: If securityfs is mounted in a userns and fill_super is called you need to call int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, (which you really should call ima_securitfs_init()...) and when you create those entries for non-init-securityfs you just need sm like: struct dentry *dentry; /* XXXX useless comment XXXX: * The lookup_one_len() function will always return with an * increased refcount on the dentry that you need to release. */ dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name)); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) return dentry; /* Return error if the file/dir already exists. */ if (d_really_is_positive(dentry)) { /* * XXXX useless comment XXXX: * Put the reference from lookup_one_len() */ dput(dentry); return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); } inode = new_inode(dir->i_sb); if (!inode) { error = -ENOMEM; goto out1; } // DO A LOT OF OTHER STUFF d_instantiate(dentry, new_inode); // DON'T CALL dget() again The point is to not increase the refcount again like securityfs_create_dentry() does after d_instantiate which requires you to call securityfs_remove(). That's unnecessary for the non-init_user_ns-securityfs case and then you don't need all that cleanup stuff in kill_super() and can just rely on d_genocide() and the dcache shrinker to do all the required work. Don't hold on to objects that can go away beneath you in any structs. Stashing them in ima_namespace will just make people think that these things can be accessed without any lifetime concerns which is imho an invitation to disaster in the long run.