Instead of calculating a file hash and verifying the signature stored in the security.ima xattr against the calculated file hash, verify the signature based on the fs-verity's file digest and other metadata. The fs-verity file digest is a hash that includes the Merkle tree root hash. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Changelog v1: - Based on Eric Bigger's review, instead of verifying the fsverity's file digest directly, sign a hash of it with other file metadata. security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 20 ++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 7505563315cb..4fe7bc99378a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -200,6 +201,23 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, allowed_algos); } +static int ima_collect_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct ima_digest_data *hash) +{ + u8 verity_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + enum hash_algo verity_alg; + int rc; + + rc = fsverity_collect_digest(iint->inode, verity_digest, &verity_alg); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; + if (hash->algo != verity_alg) + return -EINVAL; + hash->length = hash_digest_size[verity_alg]; + memcpy(hash->digest, verity_digest, hash->length); + return 0; +} + /* * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement * @@ -251,6 +269,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (buf) result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); + else if (veritysig) + result = ima_collect_verity_digest(iint, &hash.hdr); else result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 549fe051269a..53938aa0497a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -240,6 +240,11 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) { + u8 verity_digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 1]; + struct { + struct ima_digest_data hdr; + char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + } hash; int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0; switch (xattr_value->type) { @@ -277,7 +282,45 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *status = INTEGRITY_PASS; break; case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG: - fallthrough; + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + + /* + * The IMA signature is based on a hash of IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG + * and the fs-verity file digest, not directly on the + * fs-verity file digest. Both digests should probably be + * included in the IMA measurement list, but for now this + * digest is only used for verifying the IMA signature. + */ + verity_digest[0] = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG; + memcpy(verity_digest + 1, iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); + + hash.hdr.algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; + hash.hdr.length = iint->ima_hash->length; + + rc = ima_calc_buffer_hash(verity_digest, + iint->ima_hash->length + 1, + &hash.hdr); + if (rc) { + *cause = "verity-hashing-error"; + *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + break; + } + + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, + hash.hdr.digest, + hash.hdr.length); + + if (rc) { + *cause = "invalid-verity-signature"; + *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } else { + *status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + } + + break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, -- 2.27.0