Re: [RFC 20/20] ima: Setup securityfs_ns for IMA namespace

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On 12/1/21 12:56, James Bottomley wrote:
On Tue, 2021-11-30 at 11:06 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
[...]
+
+/*
+ * Fix the ownership (uid/gid) of the dentry's that couldn't be set
at the
+ * time of their creation because the user namespace wasn't
configured, yet.
+ */
+static void ima_fs_ns_fixup_uid_gid(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct inode *inode;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (ns->file_ownership_fixes_done ||
+	    ns->user_ns->uid_map.nr_extents == 0)
+		return;
+
+	ns->file_ownership_fixes_done = true;
+	for (i = 0; i < IMAFS_DENTRY_LAST; i++) {
+		if (!ns->dentry[i])
+			continue;
+		inode = ns->dentry[i]->d_inode;
+		inode->i_uid = make_kuid(ns->user_ns, 0);
+		inode->i_gid = make_kgid(ns->user_ns, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Fix the permissions when a file is opened */
+int ima_fs_ns_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct
inode *inode,
+			 int mask)
+{
+	ima_fs_ns_fixup_uid_gid(get_current_ns());
+	return generic_permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
+}
+
+const struct inode_operations ima_fs_ns_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup		= simple_lookup,
+	.permission	= ima_fs_ns_permission,
+};
+
In theory this uid/gid shifting should have already been done for you
and all of the above code should be unnecessary.  What is supposed to
happen is that the mount of securityfs_ns in the new user namespace
should pick up a superblock s_user_ns for that new user namespace.  Now
inode_alloc() uses i_uid_write(inode, 0) which maps back through the
s_user_ns to obtain the owner of the user namespace.

What can happen is that if you do the inode allocation before (or even
without) writing to the uid_map file, it maps back through an empty map
and ends up with -1 for i_uid ... is this what you're seeing?

I tried this with runc and a user namespace active mapping uid 1000 on the host to uid 0 in the container. There I run into the problem that all of the files and directories without the above work-around are mapped to 'nobody', just like all the files in sysfs in this case are also mapped to nobody. This code resolved the issue.


sh-5.1# ls -l /sys/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x.   2 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 block
drwxr-xr-x.  28 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 bus
drwxr-xr-x.  54 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 class
drwxr-xr-x.   4 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 dev
drwxr-xr-x.  15 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 devices
drwxrwxrwt.   2 root   root   40 Dec  1 18:06 firmware
drwxr-xr-x.   9 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 fs
drwxr-xr-x.  16 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 kernel
drwxr-xr-x. 161 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 module
drwxr-xr-x.   3 nobody nobody  0 Dec  1 18:06 power

sh-5.1# ls -l /sys/kernel/security/
total 0
lr--r--r--. 1 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 18:06 ima -> integrity/ima
drwxr-xr-x. 3 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 18:06 integrity

sh-5.1# ls -l /sys/kernel/security/ima/
total 0
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  1 18:06 ascii_runtime_measurements
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  1 18:06 binary_runtime_measurements
-rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec  1 18:06 policy
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  1 18:06 runtime_measurements_count
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec  1 18:06 violations

The nobody's are obviously sufficient to cd into the directories, but for file accesses I wanted to see root and no changes to permissions.

    Stefan


James





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