On 8/4/2021 2:20 AM, THOBY Simon wrote:
By default, writes to the extended attributes security.ima will be
allowed even if the hash algorithm used for the xattr is not compiled
in the kernel (which does not make sense because the kernel would not
be able to appraise that file as it lacks support for validating the
hash).
Prevent writes to the security.ima xattr if the hash algorithm used is
not available in the current kernel. Lo an audit message if such an
operation is attempted.
Typo: Lo => Log
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Simon Thoby <simon.thoby@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 2f4c20b16ad7..829478dabeeb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func);
-enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len);
int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 63bec42c353f..ed1a98f6ee19 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
}
-enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
@@ -575,6 +575,51 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
}
+/**
+ * validate_hash_algo() - Block setxattr with invalid digests
+ * @dentry: object being setxattr()'ed
+ * @xattr_value: value supplied by userland for the xattr
+ * @xattr_value_len: length of xattr_value
+ *
+ * Context: called when the user tries to write the security.ima xattr.
+ * The xattr value is mapped to some hash algorithm, and this algorithm
+ * must be built in the kernel for the setxattr to be allowed.
+ *
+ * Emit an audit message when the algorithm is invalid.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, else an error.
+ */
+static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ char *path = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
+ enum hash_algo xattr_hash_algo;
+
+ xattr_hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+
+ if (likely(xattr_hash_algo == ima_hash_algo ||
+ crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[xattr_hash_algo], 0, 0)))
+ return result;
+
+ result = -EACCES;
+
+ pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pathbuf)
+ return result;
+
+ path = dentry_path(dentry, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry), path,
+ "collect_data", "unavailable-hash-algorithm",
+ result, 0);
+
+ kfree(pathbuf);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
@@ -595,6 +640,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
if (result == 1)
result = 0;
+
+ result = validate_hash_algo(dentry, xvalue, xattr_value_len);
}
return result;
}
