While users can restrict the accepted hash algorithms for the
security.ima xattr file signature when appraising said file, users
cannot restrict the algorithms that can be set on that attribute:
any algorithm built in the kernel is accepted on a write.
Define a new value for the ima policy option 'func' that restricts
globally the hash algorithms accepted when writing the security.ima
xattr.
When a policy contains a rule of the form
appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_hash=sha256,sha384,sha512
only values corresponding to one of these three digest algorithms
will be accepted for writing the security.ima xattr.
Attempting to write the attribute using another algorithm (or "free-form"
data) will be denied with an audit log message.
In the absence of such a policy rule, the default is still to only
accept hash algorithms built in the kernel (with all the limitations
that entails).
Signed-off-by: Simon Thoby <simon.thoby@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 31 ++++++++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index aeb622698047..537be0e1720e 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -30,9 +30,10 @@ Description:
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_hash=] [keyrings=]
base:
func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
- [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
+ [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
[KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
+ [SETXATTR_CHECK]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
[[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
@@ -138,3 +139,9 @@ Description:
keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
+
+ Example of the special SETXATTR_CHECK appraise rule, that
+ restricts the hash algorithms allowed when writing to the
+ security.ima xattr of a file:
+
+ appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_hash=sha256,sha384,sha512
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 7ef1b214d358..aeb3bf30c0f9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
/* current content of the policy */
extern int ima_policy_flag;
+/* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */
+extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
+
/* set during initialization */
extern int ima_hash_algo __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
@@ -198,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \
+ hook(SETXATTR_CHECK, setxattr_check) \
hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 12d406b5ab35..c4a43c84da5f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -596,13 +596,33 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
{
char *path = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
enum hash_algo xattr_hash_algo;
+ const char *errmsg = "unavailable-hash-algorithm";
+ unsigned int allowed_hashes;
xattr_hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo((struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
- if (likely(xattr_hash_algo == ima_hash_algo ||
- crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[xattr_hash_algo], 0, 0)))
- return 0;
+ allowed_hashes = atomic_read(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms);
+
+ if (allowed_hashes) {
+ /* success if the algorithm is whitelisted in the ima policy */
+ if (allowed_hashes & (1U << xattr_hash_algo))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We use a different audit message when the hash algorithm
+ * is denied by a policy rule, instead of not being built
+ * in the kernel image
+ */
+ errmsg = "denied-hash-algorithm";
+ } else {
+ if (likely(xattr_hash_algo == ima_hash_algo))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* allow any xattr using an algorithm built in the kernel */
+ if (crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[xattr_hash_algo], 0, 0))
+ return 0;
+ }
pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pathbuf) {
@@ -610,11 +630,10 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
/*
* disallow xattr writes with algorithms disabled in the
- * kernel configuration
+ * kernel configuration or denied by policy
*/
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry),
- path, "collect_data",
- "unavailable-hash-algorithm",
+ path, "collect_data", errmsg,
-EACCES, 0);
kfree(pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f944c3e7f340..4e2410b826e2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ int ima_policy_flag;
static int temp_ima_appraise;
static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
+atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
+
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
@@ -903,6 +905,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ atomic_xchg(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, 0);
+
ima_update_policy_flag();
}
@@ -914,6 +918,42 @@ int ima_check_policy(void)
return 0;
}
+/** update_allowed_hash_algorithms - update the hash algorithms allowed
+ * for setxattr writes
+ *
+ * Update the atomic variable holding the set of allowed hash algorithms
+ * that can be used to update the security.ima xattr of a file.
+ *
+ * Context: called when updating the IMA policy.
+ *
+ * SETXATTR_CHECK rules do not implement a full policy check because of
+ * the performance impact performing rules checking on setxattr() would
+ * have. The consequence is that only one SETXATTR_CHECK can be active at
+ * a time.
+ */
+static void update_allowed_hash_algorithms(void)
+{
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+ /*
+ * We scan in reverse order because only the last entry with the
+ * 'func=SETXATTR_CHECK' apply: this allows runtime upgrades of the
+ * digest algorithm policy, unlike the other IMA rules that are
+ * usually append-only. Old rules will still be present in the
+ * ruleset, but inactive.
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_reverse(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ if (entry->func != SETXATTR_CHECK)
+ continue;
+
+ atomic_xchg(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms,
+ entry->allowed_hashes);
+ break;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
/**
* ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
*
@@ -931,6 +971,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
+
if (ima_rules != policy) {
ima_policy_flag = 0;
ima_rules = policy;
@@ -944,6 +985,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
kfree(arch_policy_entry);
}
ima_update_policy_flag();
+ update_allowed_hash_algorithms();
/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
ima_process_queued_keys();
@@ -1176,6 +1218,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
return false;
+ break;
+ case SETXATTR_CHECK:
+ /* any action other than APPRAISE is unsupported */
+ if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * full policies are not supported, they would have too
+ * much of a performance impact
+ */
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_VALIDATE_HASH))
+ return false;
+
break;
default:
return false;
@@ -1332,6 +1387,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "SETXATTR_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = SETXATTR_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
--
2.31.1
