On 7/1/2021 5:55 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() currently
don't return a result. A caller wouldn't be able to know whether those
functions were executed successfully.
This patch modifies the return type from void to int, and returns 0 if the
buffer has been successfully measured, a negative value otherwise.
Also, this patch does not modify the behavior of existing callers by
processing the returned value. Instead, the value is stored in a variable
marked as __maybe_unused.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 15 +++---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 48 ++++++++++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 15 +++---
security/selinux/ima.c | 10 ++--
8 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 81e830d01ced..60492263aa64 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
-extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
- const char *event_name,
- const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
- bool hash);
+extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
+ const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
+ bool hash);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
@@ -144,10 +144,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
-static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
+static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
const char *event_name,
const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
- bool hash) {}
+ bool hash)
+{
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f0e448ed1f9f..03db221324c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
- const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *func_data,
- bool buf_hash);
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+ const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int pcr, const char *func_data,
+ bool buf_hash);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index ef9dcfce45d4..275a2377743f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
const u8 *digest = NULL;
u32 digestsize = 0;
+ int process_rc __maybe_unused;
int rc = 0;
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
@@ -355,7 +356,8 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, digest, digestsize,
+ process_rc = process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns,
I think there is no need to make this change now. If and when
ima_check_blacklist() needs to look at the return value of p_b_m(), this
change can be made.
+ NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL, false);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index c985418698a4..910367cdd920 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
unsigned long flags, bool create)
{
bool queued = false;
+ int ret __maybe_unused;
/* Only asymmetric keys are handled by this hook. */
if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
@@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
* to the given keyring.
*/
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, payload, payload_len,
+ ret = process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL,
+ payload, payload_len,
Same comment as in ima_check_blacklist() - this change be made when needed.
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description, false);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 5076a7d9d23e..6790eea88db8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
int __init ima_init(void)
{
+ int measure_rc __maybe_unused;
int rc;
ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
@@ -153,8 +154,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
ima_init_key_queue();
- ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
- UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE), false);
+ measure_rc = ima_measure_critical_data("kernel_info", "kernel_version",
+ UTS_RELEASE, strlen(UTS_RELEASE),
+ false);
Same comment as in ima_check_blacklist() - this change be made when needed.
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8ef1fa357e0c..3386e7436440 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
-/*
+/**
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
@@ -840,12 +840,15 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
* @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
*
* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, a negative value
+ * otherwise.
*/
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
- const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *func_data,
- bool buf_hash)
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+ const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int pcr, const char *func_data,
+ bool buf_hash)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -867,7 +870,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
u32 secid;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
- return;
+ return -ENOENT;
template = ima_template_desc_buf();
if (!template) {
@@ -889,7 +892,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
- return;
+ return -ENOENT;
}
if (!pcr)
@@ -937,7 +940,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
func_measure_str(func),
audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
- return;
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -951,6 +954,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{
struct fd f;
+ int ret __maybe_unused;
if (!buf || !size)
return;
@@ -959,9 +963,10 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
if (!f.file)
return;
- process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
- buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
- NULL, false);
+ ret = process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file),
+ file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
+ "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
+ NULL, false);
Since the return value of p_b_m() is not used here, this change can be
made when needed.
fdput(f);
}
@@ -977,18 +982,21 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
* and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data
* structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
* impact the integrity of the system.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, a negative value
+ * otherwise.
*/
-void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
- const char *event_name,
- const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
- bool hash)
+int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
+ const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
+ bool hash)
{
if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
- return;
+ return -ENOPARAM;
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
- CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label,
- hash);
+ return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
+ event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
+ event_label, hash);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index 979ef6c71f3d..e3047ce64f39 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
{
struct ima_key_entry *entry, *tmp;
bool process = false;
+ int ret __maybe_unused;
if (ima_process_keys)
return;
@@ -159,13 +160,13 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
if (!timer_expired)
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL,
- entry->payload,
- entry->payload_len,
- entry->keyring_name,
- KEY_CHECK, 0,
- entry->keyring_name,
- false);
+ ret = process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL,
+ entry->payload,
+ entry->payload_len,
+ entry->keyring_name,
+ KEY_CHECK, 0,
+ entry->keyring_name,
+ false);
Same comment as above.
list_del(&entry->list);
ima_free_key_entry(entry);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c
index 34d421861bfc..4db9fa211638 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ima.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ima.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
char *state_str = NULL;
void *policy = NULL;
size_t policy_len;
+ int measure_rc __maybe_unused;
int rc = 0;
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&state->policy_mutex));
@@ -85,8 +86,9 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
return;
}
- ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
- state_str, strlen(state_str), false);
+ measure_rc = ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
+ state_str, strlen(state_str),
+ false);
Since the return value of ima_measure_critical_data() is not used here,
this change can be made when needed.
kfree(state_str);
@@ -102,8 +104,8 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state)
return;
}
- ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
- policy, policy_len, true);
+ measure_rc = ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
+ policy, policy_len, true);
Same comment as above.
-lakshmi
vfree(policy);
}
