On Tue, 2021-05-11 at 14:56 +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
> Allow user to set signature's keyid using `--keyid' option. Keyid should
> correspond to SKID in certificate, when keyid is calculated using SHA-1
> in libimaevm it may mismatch keyid extracted by the kernel from SKID of
> certificate (the way public key is presented to the kernel), thus making
> signatures not verifiable. This may happen when certificate is using non
> SHA-1 SKID (see rfc7093) or just 'unique number' (see rfc5280 4.2.1.2).
> As a last resort user may specify arbitrary keyid using the new option.
>
> This commit creates ABI change for libimaevm, because of adding
> additional parameter to imaevm_params - newer libimaevm cannot work
> with older clients.
Thank you for highlighting the ABI change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reported-by: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter0@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> README | 1 +
> src/evmctl.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> src/imaevm.h | 1 +
> src/libimaevm.c | 8 +++++---
> tests/sign_verify.test | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/README b/README
> index 321045d..8cd66e0 100644
> --- a/README
> +++ b/README
> @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ OPTIONS
> --xattr-user store xattrs in user namespace (for testing purposes)
> --rsa use RSA key type and signing scheme v1
> -k, --key path to signing key (default: /etc/keys/{privkey,pubkey}_evm.pem)
> + --keyid val overwrite signature keyid with a value (for signing)
> -o, --portable generate portable EVM signatures
> -p, --pass password for encrypted signing key
> -r, --recursive recurse into directories (sign)
> diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
> index 7a6f202..d853d34 100644
> --- a/src/evmctl.c
> +++ b/src/evmctl.c
> @@ -2514,6 +2514,7 @@ static void usage(void)
> " --xattr-user store xattrs in user namespace (for testing purposes)\n"
> " --rsa use RSA key type and signing scheme v1\n"
> " -k, --key path to signing key (default: /etc/keys/{privkey,pubkey}_evm.pem)\n"
> + " --keyid val overwrite signature keyid with a value (for signing)\n"
> " -o, --portable generate portable EVM signatures\n"
> " -p, --pass password for encrypted signing key\n"
> " -r, --recursive recurse into directories (sign)\n"
> @@ -2594,6 +2595,7 @@ static struct option opts[] = {
> {"ignore-violations", 0, 0, 141},
> {"pcrs", 1, 0, 142},
> {"verify-bank", 2, 0, 143},
> + {"keyid", 1, 0, 144},
> {}
>
> };
> @@ -2638,6 +2640,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> int err = 0, c, lind;
> ENGINE *eng = NULL;
> + unsigned long keyid;
> + char *eptr;
>
> #if !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000)
> OPENSSL_init_crypto(
> @@ -2785,6 +2789,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> case 143:
> verify_bank = optarg;
> break;
> + case 144:
> + errno = 0;
> + keyid = strtoul(optarg, &eptr, 16);
> + if (errno || eptr - optarg != strlen(optarg) ||
Before using eptr, shouldn't there be a null test? It's unclear what
verifying the resulting string length against the user provided length
provides. Requiring the optarg value to be prefixed with "0x" would
simplify the strlen test. The length would be 2 * sizeof uint + 2.
(The subsequent patch wouldn't need a contrived prefix.)
> + keyid == ULONG_MAX || keyid > UINT_MAX ||
Why are both of these tests required? When ULONG_MAX and UINT_MAX
aren't the same, wouldn't ULONG_MAX always be bigger than UINT_MAX?
> + keyid == 0) {
> + log_err("Invalid keyid value.\n");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + imaevm_params.keyid = keyid;
> + break;
> case '?':
> exit(1);
> break;
> diff --git a/src/imaevm.h b/src/imaevm.h
> index 4503919..9f38059 100644
> --- a/src/imaevm.h
> +++ b/src/imaevm.h
> @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ struct libimaevm_params {
> const char *hash_algo;
> const char *keyfile;
> const char *keypass;
> + uint32_t keyid; /* keyid overriding value, unless 0. */
If keyid is suppose to be big endiran format, please annotate it in the
comment.
> };
>
> struct RSA_ASN1_template {
> diff --git a/src/libimaevm.c b/src/libimaevm.c
> index fa6c278..481d29d 100644
> --- a/src/libimaevm.c
> +++ b/src/libimaevm.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
> #include <sys/param.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <asm/byteorder.h>
> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <dirent.h>
> #include <string.h>
> @@ -894,7 +895,6 @@ static int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash,
> const EVP_MD *md;
> size_t sigsize;
> const char *st;
> - uint32_t keyid;
>
> if (!hash) {
> log_err("sign_hash_v2: hash is null\n");
> @@ -932,8 +932,10 @@ static int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash,
> return -1;
> }
>
> - calc_keyid_v2(&keyid, name, pkey);
> - hdr->keyid = keyid;
> + if (imaevm_params.keyid)
> + hdr->keyid = htonl(imaevm_params.keyid);
> + else
> + calc_keyid_v2(&hdr->keyid, name, pkey);
>
At what point should imaevm_params.keyid be converted to big endian -
on usage or setting it?
Mimi
> st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new";
> if (!(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)))
> diff --git a/tests/sign_verify.test b/tests/sign_verify.test
> index 3d7aa51..eccf5fa 100755
> --- a/tests/sign_verify.test
> +++ b/tests/sign_verify.test
> @@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ sign_verify rsa1024 sha256 0x0301 --rsa
> sign_verify rsa1024 md5 0x030201:K:0080
> sign_verify rsa1024 sha1 0x030202:K:0080
> sign_verify rsa1024 sha224 0x030207:K:0080
> +expect_pass check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=rsa1024 ALG=sha256 PREFIX=0x030204aabbccdd0080 OPTS=--keyid=aabbccdd
> sign_verify rsa1024 sha256 0x030204:K:0080
> try_different_keys
> try_different_sigs
