This series is being sent as an RFC. I am looking for feedback; if adding additional MOK variables would be an acceptable solution to help downstream Linux distros solve some of the problems we are facing? Currently, pre-boot keys are not trusted within the Linux boundary [1]. Pre-boot keys include UEFI Secure Boot DB keys and MOKList keys. These keys are loaded into the platform keyring and can only be used for kexec. If an end-user wants to use their own key within the Linux trust boundary, they must either compile it into the kernel themselves or use the insert-sys-cert script. Both options present a problem. Many end-users do not want to compile their own kernels. With the insert-sys-cert option, there are missing upstream changes [2]. Also, with the insert-sys-cert option, the end-user must re-sign their kernel again with their own key, and then insert that key into the MOK db. Another problem with insert-sys-cert is that only a single key can be inserted into a compressed kernel. Having the ability to insert a key into the Linux trust boundary opens up various possibilities. The end-user can use a pre-built kernel and sign their own kernel modules. It also opens up the ability for an end-user to more easily use digital signature based IMA-appraisal. To get a key into the ima keyring, it must be signed by a key within the Linux trust boundary. Downstream Linux distros try to have a single signed kernel for each architecture. Each end-user may use this kernel in entirely different ways. Some downstream kernels have chosen to always trust platform keys within the Linux trust boundary. In addition, most downstream kernels do not have an easy way for an end-user to use digital signature based IMA-appraisal. This series adds two new MOK variables to shim. The first variable allows the end-user to decide if they want to trust keys contained within the platform keyring within the Linux trust boundary. By default, nothing changes; platform keys are not trusted within the Linux kernel. They are only trusted after the end-user makes the decision themself. The end-user would set this through mokutil using a new --trust-platform option [3]. This would work similar to how the kernel uses MOK variables to enable/disable signature validation as well as use/ignore the db. The second MOK variable allows a downstream Linux distro to make better use of the IMA architecture specific Secure Boot policy. This IMA policy is enabled whenever Secure Boot is enabled. By default, this new MOK variable is not defined. This causes the IMA architecture specific Secure Boot policy to be disabled. Since this changes the current behavior, it is placed behind a new Kconfig option. Kernels built with IMA_UEFI_ARCH_POLICY enabled would allow the end-user to enable this through mokutil using a new --ima-sb-enable option [3]. This gives the downstream Linux distro the capability to offer the IMA architecture specific Secure Boot policy option, while giving the end-user the ability to decide if they want to use it. I have included links to both the mokutil [3] and shim [4] changes I made to support this new functionality. Thank you and looking forward to hearing your reviews. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1556221605.24945.3.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/902768/ [3] https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/0.3.0-mokvars [4] https://github.com/esnowberg/shim/tree/mokvars Eric Snowberg (3): keys: Add ability to trust the platform keyring keys: Trust platform keyring if MokTrustPlatform found ima: Enable IMA SB Policy if MokIMAPolicy found certs/system_keyring.c | 19 ++++++++- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 10 +++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 8 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 24 ++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.18.4
