On Mon, 2020-11-16 at 18:08 +0000, Al Viro wrote: > On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 09:37:32AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 8:47 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > This discussion seems to be going down the path of requiring an IMA > > > filesystem hook for reading the file, again. That solution was > > > rejected, not by me. What is new this time? > > > > You can't read a non-read-opened file. Not even IMA can. > > > > So don't do that then. > > > > IMA is doing something wrong. Why would you ever read a file that can't be read? > > > > Fix whatever "open" function instead of trying to work around the fact > > that you opened it wrong. > > IMA pulls that crap on _every_ open(2), including O_WRONLY. As far as I'm > concerned, the only sane answer is not enabling that thing on your builds; > they are deeply special and I hadn't been able to reason with them no > matter how much I tried ;-/ The builtin IMA policies are only meant to be used until a custom can be loaded. The decision as to what should be measured or verified is left up to the system owner. In terms of the architecture specific policy rules, there are rules to: - measure the kexec kernel image and kernel modules - verify the kexec kernel image and kernel modules appended signatures These rules should be pretty straight forward to verify. Mimi
