From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy is loaded. For example, SELinux calls ima_measure_critical_data() to measure its state and policy when they are initialized. This occurs before a custom IMA policy is loaded, and hence IMA hook will not measure the data. A built-in policy is therefore needed to measure critical data provided by callers before a custom IMA policy is loaded. Add CRITICAL_DATA to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Set the IMA template for this rule to "ima-buf" since ima_measure_critical_data() measures a buffer. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index ec99e0bb6c6f..dc8fe969d3fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; +static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else @@ -813,6 +820,8 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) void __init ima_init_policy(void) { int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries; + struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; + int ret = 0; /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ if (ima_policy) @@ -875,6 +884,29 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + if (ima_use_critical_data) { + template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf"); + if (!template) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt, + &(template->fields), + &(template->num_fields)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + critical_data_rules[0].template = template; + add_rules(critical_data_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + } + +out: + if (ret) + pr_err("%s failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret); + ima_update_policy_flag(); } -- 2.17.1