Re: [PATCH v3 1/6] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs

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On 2020-08-31 4:55 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Thu, 2020-08-27 at 18:56 -0700, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(),
ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently,
these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data.
This makes it harder to extend without code duplication.

Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and
reusable in other measurement scenarios.

Mostly this patch changes the variable name from keyring to func_data,
which is good.  Other changes should be minimized.

The only other change in this patch is introduction of
bool allow_empty_opt_list, which is needed as per my comment below.

Maybe I can move "allow_empty_opt_list" to a new patch after this one in
this series.


Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

<snip>

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index fe1df373c113..8866e84d0062 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -451,15 +451,21 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
  }
/**
- * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule
- * @rule: a pointer to a rule
- * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule
+ * ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches
+ *			 the measure rule data
+ * @rule: IMA policy rule
+ * @opt_list: rule data to match func_data against
+ * @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data
+ * @allow_empty_opt_list: If true matches all func_data
   * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
   *
- * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
+ * Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
   */
-static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
-			      const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
+static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
+				const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list,

Ok

+				const char *func_data,
+				bool allow_empty_opt_list,

As the policy is loaded, shouldn't the rules should be checked, not
here on usage?

Mimi

Since "keyrings=" is optional, I cannot check the rule at load time for
keyrings. func=KEY_CHECK may or may not have "keyrings=", and both are
valid scenarios.

However "critical_kernel_data_sources=" is mandatory for func=CRITICAL_DATA.

So I am already making that check at policy load time.

See patch 5/6 – function ima_match_rules(), where I check for
IMA_DATA_SOURCES.

+       case CRITICAL_DATA:
<snip>
+               if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) ||
<snip>
+                       return false;
+

Since ima_match_rule_data (this function) handles both func=KEY_CHECK and func=CRITICAL_DATA, we have to use the bool "allow_empty_opt_list"
to differentiate between the two scenarios – whether the rule is
optional or not for a given func.


+				const struct cred *cred)
  {
  	bool matched = false;
  	size_t i;




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