Hi Mickael,
On Tue, 2020-09-08 at 09:59 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 9af548fb841b..879bdfbdc6fa 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -405,9 +405,13 @@ static long do_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode, int fla
> if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - if (flags & ~(AT_EACCESS | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH))
> + if (flags & ~(AT_EACCESS | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH |
> + AT_INTERPRETED))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* Only allows X_OK with AT_INTERPRETED for now. */
> + if ((flags & AT_INTERPRETED) && !(mode & S_IXOTH))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
> lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
> if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
> @@ -426,7 +430,30 @@ static long do_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode, int fla
>
> inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
>
> - if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
> + if ((flags & AT_INTERPRETED)) {
> + /*
> + * For compatibility reasons, without a defined security policy
> + * (via sysctl or LSM), using AT_INTERPRETED must map the
> + * execute permission to the read permission. Indeed, from
> + * user space point of view, being able to execute data (e.g.
> + * scripts) implies to be able to read this data.
> + *
> + * The MAY_INTERPRETED_EXEC bit is set to enable LSMs to add
> + * custom checks, while being compatible with current policies.
> + */
> + if ((mode & MAY_EXEC)) {
Why is the ISREG() test being dropped? Without dropping it, there
would be no reason for making the existing test an "else" clause.
> + mode |= MAY_INTERPRETED_EXEC;
> + /*
> + * For compatibility reasons, if the system-wide policy
> + * doesn't enforce file permission checks, then
> + * replaces the execute permission request with a read
> + * permission request.
> + */
> + mode &= ~MAY_EXEC;
> + /* To be executed *by* user space, files must be readable. */
> + mode |= MAY_READ;
After this change, I'm wondering if it makes sense to add a call to
security_file_permission(). IMA doesn't currently define it, but
could.
Mimi
> + }
> + } else if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
> /*
> * MAY_EXEC on regular files is denied if the fs is mounted
> * with the "noexec" flag.
