There are several kernel components that contain critical data which if accidentally or maliciously altered, can compromise the security of the kernel. Example of such components would include LSMs like SELinux, or AppArmor; or device-mapper targets like dm-crypt, dm-verity etc. Many of these components do not use the capabilities provided by kernel integrity subsystem (IMA), and thus they don't use the benefits of extended TPM PCR quotes and ultimately the benefits of remote attestation. This series bridges this gap, so that potential kernel components that contain data critical to the security of the kernel could take advantage of IMA's measuring and quoting abilities - thus ultimately enabling remote attestation for their specific data. System administrators may want to pick and choose which kernel components they would want to enable for measurements, quoting, and remote attestation. To enable that, a new IMA policy is introduced. And lastly, the functionality is exposed through a function ima_measure_critical_data(). The functionality is generic enough to measure the data of any kernel component at runtime. This series is based on the following repo/branch: repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git branch: next-integrity This series also has a dependency on the following patch series: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ Tushar Sugandhi (3): IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs IMA: add policy to support measuring critical data from kernel components IMA: define IMA hook to measure critical data from kernel components Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 12 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 46 +++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++------- 6 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1
