Hi Lakshmi, There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level. On Tue, 2020-08-04 at 17:43 -0700, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to > enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and > policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and > that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is > required for handling this measurement. > > Define two new IMA policy func namely LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY to > measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. > Update ima_match_rules() and ima_validate_rule() to check for > the new func and ima_parse_rule() to handle the new func. I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files. Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls - finit_module, kexec_file_load - pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided. Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed. Mimi
