Re: [PATCH v2 05/11] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond

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On 6/26/20 3:38 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.

Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.

An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:

  dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t

An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.

Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---

* v2
   - Added Mimi's Reviewed-by

  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 166124d67774..676d5557af1a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  	return 0;
  }
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
  /*
   * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
   * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -993,6 +1004,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  		case POLICY_CHECK:
  			break;
  		case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+			if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+				return false;
+
+			if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
+				return false;
+
+			if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+				return false;
+
+			break;
  		case KEY_CHECK:
  			if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
  				return false;


Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>




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