Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
measure or not
Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
full list of conditional comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: kexec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
* v2
- Moved the inode parameter of process_buffer_measurement() to be the
first parameter so that it more closely matches process_masurement()
include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++--
kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 17 +++++----------
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 9164e1534ec9..d15100de6cdd 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
-extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
+extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
+static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index bb05fd52de85..07df431c1f21 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
goto out;
}
- ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf,
+ ima_kexec_cmdline(kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 59ec28f5c117..ff2bf57ff0c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index bf22de8b7ce0..4f39fb93f278 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
/**
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
- * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
* @secid: secid of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..6c52bf7ea7f0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
- process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index aaae80c4e376..1c68c500c26f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
* to the given keyring.
*/
- process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8351b2fd48e0..8a91711ca79b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
/*
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
+ * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
* @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
@@ -735,7 +736,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
*
* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
*/
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring)
{
@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
&pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
@@ -823,16 +824,26 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
/**
* ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
+ * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
* @buf: pointer to buffer
* @size: size of buffer
*
* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
*/
-void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{
- if (buf && size != 0)
- process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
- KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+ struct fd f;
+
+ if (!buf || !size)
+ return;
+
+ f = fdget(kernel_fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return;
+
+ process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
+ "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+ fdput(f);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 5eb14b567a31..294323b36d06 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -443,13 +443,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
{
int i;
- if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) {
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) {
- if (func == KEY_CHECK)
- return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
- return true;
- }
- return false;
+ if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
+ return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
+ ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
}
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
(rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
@@ -1007,10 +1003,9 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
return false;
- if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
- return false;
-
- if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID |
+ IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+ IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME))
return false;
break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index 56ce24a18b66..69a8626a35c0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
if (!timer_expired)
- process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload,
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload,
entry->payload_len,
entry->keyring_name,
KEY_CHECK, 0,
--
2.25.1
