On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 12:41 -0700, Scott Branden wrote: > > On 2020-05-13 12:39 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 12:18 -0700, Scott Branden wrote: > >> On 2020-05-13 12:03 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: > >>> On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 11:53 -0700, Scott Branden wrote: > >> Even if the kernel successfully verified the firmware file signature it > >> would just be wasting its time. The kernel in these use cases is not always > >> trusted. The device needs to authenticate the firmware image itself. > > There are also environments where the kernel is trusted and limits the > > firmware being provided to the device to one which they signed. > > > >>> The device firmware is being downloaded piecemeal from somewhere and > >>> won't be measured? > >> It doesn't need to be measured for current driver needs. > > Sure the device doesn't need the kernel measuring the firmware, but > > hardened environments do measure firmware. > > > >> If someone has such need the infrastructure could be added to the kernel > >> at a later date. Existing functionality is not broken in any way by > >> this patch series. > > Wow! You're saying that your patch set takes precedence over the > > existing expectations and can break them. > Huh? I said existing functionality is NOT broken by this patch series. Assuming a system is configured to measure and appraise firmware (rules below), with this change the firmware file will not be properly measured and will fail signature verification. Sample IMA policy rules: measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK appraise func=FIRMWARE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig Mimi
