On Fri, 2020-05-01 at 10:16 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice
> (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc
> secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule
> only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does
> not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot
> command line (module.sig_enforce=1).
>
> Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the finit_module
> syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded onto the IMA
> keyring.
>
> This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> instead.
>
> Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules")
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks, Nayna.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
