Re: [PATCH 0/2] support to read and tune appraise mode in runtime

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On 2020/4/14 21:41, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Tue, 2020-04-14 at 11:36 +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:

On 2020/4/14 5:55, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Thu, 2020-04-09 at 11:39 +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:
Support the read and write operations of ima_appraise by adding a
securifyfs file 'appraise_mode'.

In order to tune appraise mode in runtime, writing a PKCS#7 signature
corresponding the signed content is required. The content should be off,
enforce, log or fix. Given a simple way to archive this:

$ echo -n off > mode
$ openssl smime -sign -nocerts -noattr -binary \
      -in mode -inkey <system_trusted_key> \
      -signer <cert> -outform der -out mode.p7s
$ sudo cat mode.p7s \
      > /sys/kernel/security/ima/appraise_mode

Note that the signing key must be a trust key located in
system trusted keyring. So even the root privilege cannot
simply disable the enforcement.

There are major problems with disabling IMA appraisal.  This patch set
proposes disabling IMA appraisal without even providing the motivation
for such support.

A lot of effort went into preventing custom IMA policies from
disabling appraising the kexec or kernel module signatures.  In
addition, the "lockdown" patch set was upstreamed permitting IMA
signature verification.  This patch set would break both of these
features.

IMA relies on its own keyring for verifying file signatures, not the
builtin or secondary trusted kernel keyrings.

Two methods already exist - xattr and appended signatures - for
verifying file signatures.  This patch set assumes creating and
signing a file, which is then written to a securityfs file.  Like for
loading a custom IMA policy, instead of cat'ing the file, write the
pathname to the securityfs file.

If you must define a new IMA method for verifying file signatures,
then it needs to be generic and added to ima_appraise_measurement().
   (Refer to the new IMA appended signature support.)

Mimi


Tianjia Zhang (2):
    ima: support to read appraise mode
    ima: support to tune appraise mode in runtime

   security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
   1 file changed, 133 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)


Thanks for your suggestion, the way to close the appraise mode here is
indeed a bit rude, I will reconsider again according to your suggestions.

In addition, [PATCH 1/2] ima: support to read appraise mode, by the way,
see if this patch is acceptable.

My comments were not meant as suggestions, but as an explanation as to
how IMA works.  More details follow.

IMA is based on policy.  That decision was made a long time ago.  It
allowed distros to configure IMA, allowing customers to experiment
with it.  You have one opportunity to totally change the boot time
policy rules, by loading a custom policy.  After that, rules may only
be added.

There is no valid reason for "turning off" the policy once it has been
enabled.  It breaks existing expectations.

Mimi


Thank you very much for your explanation. I'm sorry I may not have stated clearly. I didn't have to change the working mode of IMA. I was convinced by you to give up the idea of "turn off" the appraise. However, it should be possible to support appraise mode reading. Right?



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