On Thu, 2020-02-27 at 12:19 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-02-27 at 09:19 -0800, James Prestwood wrote:
> > On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 16:54 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 16:20 -0800, James Prestwood wrote:
> > > > > > I have been using your set of patches in order to get this
> > > > > > ASN.1 parser/definition. I am implementing an asymmetric
> > > > > > key
> > > > > > parser/type TPM2 keys for enc/dec/sign/verify using keyctl.
> > > > > > Note that this implementation goes in
> > > > > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/, and your patches sit in
> > > > > > security/keys/trusted-keys/.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Currently I am just including "../../security/keys/trusted-
> > > > > > keys/{tpm2key.asn1.h,tpm2-policy.h}" in order to use the
> > > > > > ASN.1 parser to verify my keys, but this obviously isn't
> > > > > > going to fly.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Do you (or anyone) have any ideas as to how both trusted
> > > > > > keys
> > > > > > and asymmetric keys could share this ASN.1
> > > > > > parser/definition?
> > > > > > Some common area that both security and crypto could
> > > > > > include?
> > > > > > Or maybe there is some common way the kernel does things
> > > > > > like
> > > > > > this?
> > > > >
> > > > > Actually TPM2 asymmetric keys was also on my list. I was
> > > > > going
> > > > > to use the existing template and simply move it somewhere
> > > > > everyone could use. I also think you need the policy parser
> > > > > pieces because at least one implementation we'd need to be
> > > > > compatible with supports key policy.
> > > >
> > > > In terms of policy, I haven't looked into that at all for
> > > > asymmetric keys. I do already have enc/dec/sign/verify
> > > > asymmetric
> > > > key operations all working, and used your ASN1 template for
> > > > parsing (just copied it into asymmetric_keys for now). Since
> > > > the
> > > > asymmetric operations use HMAC sessions I didn't see much carry
> > > > over from your patches (but this could change if policy stuff
> > > > gets introduced).
> > >
> > > There's a related patch that introduces HMAC and encryption
> > > sessions for pretty much everything in the TPM:
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
https://lore.kernel.org/r/1568031408.6613.29.camel@HansenPartnership
> > .
> > com
> > >
> > > I didn't resend this time around because of patch overload, and
> > > anyway, the last patch needs updating for the current policy c
> >
> > Well... I sure duplicated a lot of work. I haven't been on these
> > lists long enough to see that come through. I am still reading
> > through these patches, but noticed some differences already with
> > how
> > the session is started. I use the parent key handle for "salt key
> > handle" ratherthan the null key.
>
> That's a minor detail. The routines could be updated to use anything
> for the parent. The null seed is just convenient and has nice
> security
> properties.
>
> > Also I used RSA/OAEP for encrypting the salt value rather than
> > ECC.
> > I hadn't read into the null key thing, but I will now. I would be
> > more than happy to rip out the OAEP code though. I was just
> > modeling
> > everything how libtpms did it, which used OAEP.
>
> There's not much the IBM and Intel TSS teams agree on, but we do
> agree
> that RSA is a bad choice for parents and that EC keys are much
> better.
> The main reason is that most TPM 2's are much worse at RSA operations
> than EC ones ... you're looking at factors of 10x to 100x simply
> because of the huge bignum complexity of RSA, which really slows
> everything down when you use RSA parents for crypto
> operations. Then,
> as you found, no-one really does the padding with OAEP either.
I am learning lots from this discussion, so thank you. I had assumed
that the parent key crypto had to match the child key, RSA vs EC, but
sounds like that is not the case. And yes, this sounds like a much
better way to go now that I have a bit more info on it.
>
> > Obviously we don't want a bunch of duplicated code, but I am
> > somewhat
> > concerned about going right in and using these patches as they have
> > been sitting around quite a while (plus you said they will need
> > updating). Seems like the best route is get these merged, then
> > update/send my patches.
>
> So we figure out the correct precursor patches and have a couple of
> sets ... Jarkko likes stuff done this way anyway.
Ok, I'll figure out exactly what I need. Its looking like the only
duplication is starting the session and all the HMAC helpers.
>
> > > > This will go in the eventual RFC soon but while I have you
> > > > here:
> > > > I also implemented key wrapping. Exposing this as a keyctl API
> > > > may take some rework, hopefully with some help from others in
> > > > this subsystem.
> > >
> > > Wrapping for what? The output privkey in the ASN.1 is wrapped by
> > > the TPM using its internal AES key. The ASN.1 also defines ECDH
> > > wrapping, that's what the secret element of the sequence is for,
> > > but you'd only use that for creating a wrapped key to pass in to
> > > the TPM knowing the parent. The way current TPM crypto systems
> > > use
> > > this is they generate an EC parent from the storage primary seed
> > > on
> > > the NIST P256 curve.
> >
> > I implemented CC_Import(). You generate the private key yourself
> > (openssl or however) and import it into the TPM. Then the result of
> > that is the TPM wrapped key that can be loaded later on. And yes
> > this
> > depends on knowing the parent handle.
>
> Right, that's what the key wrapping code of the engine does as well,
> except that we use EC parents and ECDH wrapping.
>
> > I basically just implemented:
> >
> > create_tpm2_key -w privkey.pem -p <handle> privkey.tpm
> >
> > My reasoning for this was because I had issues with the
> > openssl_tpm2_engine, and just the whole TPM2 on Linux support as it
> > stands now. I was able to get everything working on Debian, but
> > then
> > I went to test on real TPM hardware, which happened to be a Fedora
> > box. This was a complete disaster; openssl_tpm2_engine did not
> > compile due to (I think) a library versioning issue and build
> > warnings. I ignored warnings, and manually built my own version
> > ofopenssl libtpms but this just resulted in create_tpm2_key to
> > segfault. At this point I just thought it would be more worth my
> > time
> > to implement Import() myself.
> >
> > I think this was all a result of bad packaging on Fedora's part,
> > but
> > still, the experience didn't sit well with me and I felt it would
> > be
> > worth while to add support for this in keyctl.
>
> Well there's a list you can report problems to and get help:
>
> openssl-tpm2-engine@xxxxxxxxx
>
> I've got to confess I develop on openSUSE and debian, so Fedora
> doesn't
> get much testing.
>
> > > It's on my todo list to accept bare primary identifiers as
> > > parents
> > > in the kernel code and create the EC primary on the fly, but it's
> > > not in this patch set.
> > >
> > > There's also another policy problem in that generating an RSA2048
> > > key can lock the TPM up for ages, so there should likely be some
> > > type of block on someone doing this. I was thinking that an
> > > unprivileged user should be allowed to create EC keys but not RSA
> > > ones.
> >
> > I didn't have any plans for RSA key generation inside the TPM
> > itself,
> > just wrapping/asym operations.
>
> Well as long as we're interoperable with create_tpm2_key, the
> consumer
> can generate a TPM resident key outside the kernel if they want and
> then simply pass it in.
>
> > > > As it stand now you have to padd a key pair, then do a (new)
> > > > pkey_wrap operation on it. This returns a DER with the wrapped
> > > > TPM2 key. This required modifying the public_key type, which I
> > > > really did not like since it now depends on TPM. Not sure if
> > > > the
> > > > route I went is gonna fly without tweaking, but this is all new
> > > > to me :) Again, some guidance for how this should be is needed.
> > >
> > > The way it's defined to be done using the ASN.1 secret parameter
> > > is
> > > simply the way the TPM2 command manual defines duplication with
> > > an
> > > outer wrapper. The TPM2 manual even has a coded example in
> > > section
> > > 4 and the secret is simply a TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET.
> >
> > I actually didn't do any inner/outer encryption when sending the
> > key
> > to the TPM (if this isn't what your talking about disregard). I
> > just
> > sent the private key over plainly. Maybe bus snooping is a concern,
> > but as a first pass I just punted on this.
>
> Well to get TPM2_Import to work with an encrypted secret *is* what
> the
> manuals call outer wrapping, you just used an RSA encrypted secret
> instead of an ECDH protected one. It's the same sequence of
> operations
> as for duplication.
Ok this makes more sense now.
Thanks,
James
