> On Feb 7, 2020, at 7:51 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2020-02-06 at 14:40 -0700, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>> Currently the upstream code will fail if the module is uncompressed.
>> If you compress the same module it will load with the current
>> upstream code.
>>
>>> Lastly, there is nothing in these patches that indicate that the
>> kernel modules being compressed/uncompressed is related to the
>> signature verification.
>>>
>>
>> Basically if you have the following setup:
>>
>> Kernel built with CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY or kernel booted with
>> module.sig_enforce=1 along with the following ima policy:
>>
>> appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
>
> Enabling CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY or module.sig_enforce=1 behave totally
> differently. CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY coordinates between the IMA
> signature verification and the original module_sig_check()
> verification. Either one signature verification method is enabled or
> the other, but not both.
>
> The existing IMA x86 arch policy has not been updated to support
> appended signatures.
That is not what I’m seeing. Appended signatures mostly work. They just
don’t work thru the finit_module system call.
> To understand what is happening, we need to analyze each scenario
> separately.
>
> - If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured or enabled on the boot command
> line ("module.sig_enforce = 1"), then the IMA arch x86 policy WILL NOT
> require an IMA signature.
All tests below are without my change
x86 booted with module.sig_enforce=1
empty ima policy
$ cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ insmod ./foo.ko.xz <— loads ok
$ rmmod foo
$ unxz ./foo.ko.xz
$ insmod ./foo.ko <— loads ok
$ rmmod foo
add in module appraisal
$ echo "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ insmod ./foo.ko.xz <— loads ok
$ rmmod foo
$ insmod ./foo.ko
insmod: ERROR: could not insert module ./foo.ko: Permission denied
last entry from audit log:
type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(1581089373.076:83): pid=2874 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data cause=invalid-signature comm="insmod" name="/root/keys/modules/foo.ko" dev="dm-0" ino=10918365 res=0^]UID="root" AUID=“root"
This is because modsig_verify() will be called from within ima_appraise_measurement(),
since try_modsig is true. Then modsig_verify() will return INTEGRITY_FAIL.
If I build with CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY & CONFIG_MODULE_SIG all tests work the same above,
I just don’t have to add module.sig_enforce=1 when I boot.
Adding my change will allow foo.ko to load above when “|modsig” is added, since it will now evaluate
the module. Without my change the “imsig|modsig” is true for compressed, but the policy is really
“imasig&modsig” for uncompressed.
> - If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is NOT configured or enabled on the boot
> command line, then the IMA arch x86 policy WILL require an IMA
> signature.
Agreed
> - If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured or enabled on the boot command
> line, the IMA arch x86 policy is not configured, and the above policy
> rule is defined, an appended signature will be verified by both IMA
> and module_sig_check().
I think this is the same as what I have done above?
>> If you have a module foo.ko that contains a valid appended signature
>> but is not ima signed, it will fail to load.
>
> That would only happen in the second scenario or in the last scenario
> if the key is not found.
>
>> Now if the end user simply compresses the same foo.ko, making it
>> foo.ko.xz. The module will load.
>
> This implies that CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured or enabled on the
> boot command line, like the first scenario described above, or in the
> last scenario and the key is found.
>> Modules can be loaded thru two different syscalls, finit_module and
>> init_module. The changes added in [1] work if you use the
>> init_module syscall. My change adds support when the finit_module
>> syscall gets used instead.
>
> With the IMA arch x86 policy, without CONFIG_MODULE_SIG configured or
> enabled on the boot command line, IMA will prevent the init_module()
> syscall. This is intentional.
Agreed
> Your second patch (2/2) changes the arch x86 policy rule to allow
> appended signatures. The reason for any other changes needs to be
> clearer. I suggest you look at the audit log and kernel messages, as
> well as the kexec selftests, to better understand what is happening.
>
I can add more details. I’m just trying to make it so the end user has the same
experience when using the default secure_boot ima policy. I don’t see a point in
forcing someone to compress a module to get around security, especially when they
have a policy that contains “|modsig”.
Let me know how you would like me to move forward. Are you ok with the actual code in
my patches, assuming I add a lot more details? Or do you want more analysis here first?
