On Wed, 2020-01-15 at 13:36 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Mon, 2020-01-13 at 11:48 +0100, KP Singh wrote: > > On 06-Jan 17:25, Florent Revest wrote: > > > From: Florent Revest <revest@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM > > > allowing > > > system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the > > > hash > > > of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache. > > > > > > It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in > > > the > > > audit logs or in > > > /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements, > > > but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every > > > subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has > > > been up > > > for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago. > > > > > > This is based on Peter Moody's patch: > > > https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/ > > > > > > [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393 > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Thanks for adding this Florent! > > > > Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Thanks, this patch is now queued in next-integrity-testing. Good to hear Mimi! Thank you. I would just like to make sure that you queued the v3 of this patch though...? (this thread is for the v2 :) ) The v3 includes a couple of comments you asked for.
