On Fri, 2019-12-20 at 11:25 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> On 12/20/2019 11:01 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> Hi Mimi,
>
> >> If the kernel is built with both CONFIG_IMA and
> >> CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE enabled then the IMA policy
> >> must be applied as a custom policy. Not providing a custom policy
> >> in the above configuration would result in asymmeteric keys being queued
> >> until a custom policy is loaded. This is by design.
> >
> > I didn't notice the "This is by design" here, referring to the memory
> > never being freed. "This is by design" was suppose to refer to
> > requiring a custom policy for measuring keys.
> >
> > For now, these two patches are queued in the next-integrity-testing
> > branch, but I would appreciate your addressing not freeing the memory
> > associated with the keys, if a custom policy is not loaded.
> >
> > Please note that I truncated the 2/2 patch description, as it repeats
> > the existing verification example in commit ("2b60c0ecedf8 IMA: Read
> > keyrings= option from the IMA policy").
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
>
> Sure - I am fine with truncating the 2/2 patch description. Thanks for
> doing that.
>
> Regarding "Freeing the queued keys if custom policy is not loaded":
>
> Shall I create a new patch set to address that and have that be reviewed
> independent of this patch set?
If it is just a single additional patch, feel free to post it without
a cover letter.
>
> Like you'd suggested earlier, we can wait for a certain time, after IMA
> is initialized, and free the queue if a custom policy was not loaded.
Different types of systems vary in boot time, but perhaps a certain
amount of time after IMA is initialized would be consistent. This
would need to work for IoT devices/sensors to servers.
Mimi
