Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys

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On Mon, 2019-12-09 at 16:04 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
> The big problem with this patch is still that we can't yet combine
> policy with authorization because that requires proper session
> handling, but at least with this rewrite it becomes possible (whereas
> it was never possible with the old external policy session code). 
> Thus, when we have the TPM 2.0 security patch upstream, we'll be able
> to use the session logic from that patch to imlement authorizations.

I had a discussion with Ken Goldman on Friday where he told me this
wasn't true: we can actually persuade a policy session to do a non-HMAC 
authorization (for the interested, the trick is to use
TPM2_PolicyPassword in place of TPM2_PolicyAuthValue.  It hashes to the
same policy but the former sets the session up for non-HMAC and the
latter for HMAC) so I'll add password based authorization to policies
when I respin the patch set.

James




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