On Mon, 2019-11-18 at 14:38 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > Limit measuring keys to those keys being loaded onto a given set of > keyrings only. > > This patch defines a new IMA policy option namely "keyrings=" that > can be used to specify a set of keyrings. If this option is specified > in the policy for "measure func=KEY_CHECK" then only the keys > loaded onto a keyring given in the "keyrings=" option are measured. > > Added a new parameter namely "keyring" (name of the keyring) to > process_buffer_measurement(). The keyring name is passed to > ima_get_action() to determine the required action. > ima_match_rules() is updated to check keyring in the policy, if > specified, for KEY_CHECK function. > > The following example illustrates how key measurement can be verified. > > Sample IMA Policy entry to measure keys > (Added in the file /etc/ima/ima-policy): > measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.ima|.evm|.blacklist template=ima-buf > > Build the kernel with this patch set applied and reboot to that kernel. > > Ensure the IMA policy is applied: > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.ima|.evm|.blacklist template=ima-buf > > View the initial IMA measurement log: > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements > 10 67ec... ima-ng sha1:b5466c508583f0e633df83aa58fc7c5b67ccf667 boot_aggregate > > Now, add a certificate in DER format (for example, x509_ima.der) to > the .ima keyring: > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# keyctl show %:.ima > Keyring > 547515640 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .ima > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# evmctl import x509_ima.der 547515640 > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# keyctl show %:.ima > Keyring > 547515640 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .ima > 809678766 --als--v 0 0 \_ asymmetric: hostname: whoami signing key: 052dd247dc3c36... > > View the updated IMA measurement log: > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements > 10 67ec... ima-ng sha1:b5466c508583f0e633df83aa58fc7c5b67ccf667 boot_aggregate > 10 3adf... ima-buf sha256:27c915b8ddb9fae7214cf0a8a7043cc3eeeaa7539bcb136f8427067b5f6c3b7b .ima 30818902818100ee96b264072a42888f78a2f9b8198467a3ad97d126f3d1cc1c24d23e7185cc743b04d4a54254ca16e1e11ed4450deb98b1f7bb4288424570fabcfc6d5aa93a2a14fa2b7835ac877cfea761e5ff414c6ee274eff26f8bd6c484312e56619299acf0dbd224b87c3883b66a9393d21af8962458663b0ac1706c63773cd50e8236270203010001 > root@nramas:/home/nramas# > > The public key of x509_ima.der certificate and the key's SHA-256 hash > are included in the IMA log. > > For example, in the above IMA log entry the public key is the following: > > 30818902818100ee96b264072a42888f78a2f9b8198467a3ad97d126f3d1cc1c24d23e7185cc743b04d4a54254ca16e1e11ed4450deb98b1f7bb4288424570fabcfc6d5aa93a2a14fa2b7835ac877cfea761e5ff414c6ee274eff26f8bd6c484312e56619299acf0dbd224b87c3883b66a9393d21af8962458663b0ac1706c63773cd50e8236270203010001 > > sha256:27c915b8ddb9fae7214cf0a8a7043cc3eeeaa7539bcb136f8427067b5f6c3b7b > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | > grep " .ima" | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum > 27c915b8ddb9fae7214cf0a8a7043cc3eeeaa7539bcb136f8427067b5f6c3b7b > root@nramas:/home/nramas# > > SHA-256 hash in the IMA log and the above output should match. > > Now run the following "openssl" command to display > various fields of x509_ima.der certificate: > > Verify the "Modulus" and the "Exponent" with that > in the public key data in the IMA log entry. > Note that the "Modulus" in the IMA log entry follows > the RSA Header (For example, 308189028181) > The "Exponent" is the last 3 hex numbers in the IMA log > (For example, 0x01 0x00 0x01) > > root@nramas:/home/nramas# openssl x509 -in x509_ima.der -inform der -noout -text > Certificate: > Data: > Version: 3 (0x2) > Serial Number: > 5b:e0:23:4f:f3:ad:f0:50:34:9b:33:b8:94:65:a6:aa:b6:e3:39:f7 > Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption > Issuer: O = hostname, CN = whoami signing key, emailAddress = whoami@hostname > Validity > Not Before: Aug 22 02:29:02 2019 GMT > Not After : Aug 21 02:29:02 2020 GMT > Subject: O = hostname, CN = whoami signing key, emailAddress = whoami@hostname > Subject Public Key Info: > Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption > RSA Public-Key: (1024 bit) > Modulus: > 00:ee:96:b2:64:07:2a:42:88:8f:78:a2:f9:b8:19: > 84:67:a3:ad:97:d1:26:f3:d1:cc:1c:24:d2:3e:71: > 85:cc:74:3b:04:d4:a5:42:54:ca:16:e1:e1:1e:d4: > 45:0d:eb:98:b1:f7:bb:42:88:42:45:70:fa:bc:fc: > 6d:5a:a9:3a:2a:14:fa:2b:78:35:ac:87:7c:fe:a7: > 61:e5:ff:41:4c:6e:e2:74:ef:f2:6f:8b:d6:c4:84: > 31:2e:56:61:92:99:ac:f0:db:d2:24:b8:7c:38:83: > b6:6a:93:93:d2:1a:f8:96:24:58:66:3b:0a:c1:70: > 6c:63:77:3c:d5:0e:82:36:27 > Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) > X509v3 extensions: > X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical > CA:FALSE > X509v3 Key Usage: > Digital Signature > X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: > 05:2D:D2:47:DC:3C:36:D6:D6:06:75:FE:7A:E8:69:79:0B:E5:61:71 > X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: > keyid:E3:67:10:F0:83:4C:97:3E:D9:4A:18:6F:BC:D2:23:75:B4:5E:24:54 > > Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption > b1:2f:ae:ff:1e:0e:39:0c:fd:5e:b7:14:0a:f3:b7:a6:53:cb: > 49:c6:ab:0a:23:be:24:c0:35:33:1d:76:00:c8:f7:58:f9:df: > 7f:df:c5:ee:b6:fe:c3:58:59:20:3e:ca:0e:4f:01:f9:a7:9a: > 58:be:63:09:47:cb:95:9a:52:d3:f2:de:96:f2:10:d4:92:47: > c3:3a:62:26:dc:2a:52:ee:54:10:69:ed:3c:62:1f:87:67:fd: > 36:a0:61:e9:a6:1a:db:5d:1d:d3:44:99:d9:9a:1c:e6:ba:a4: > 96:b4:f5:e2:26:8b:fc:52:c3:ee:a4:a6:b7:b5:18:1f:08:52: > 4a:ee > root@nramas:/home/nramas# > > An ima-sig entry for a kernel module, say, kheaders.ko > from the IMA log entry is given below: > > 10 0c98... ima-sig > sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40 > 2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko > 03020BE561710100abcde... > > In the above 0BE56171 is the Key ID of the key used to verify > the IMA signature. This Key ID is the last 4 hex digits of > the subject key identifier displayed in openssl output > for the certificate x509_ima.der (Which is the IMA certificate > used to sign the kernel module). > > X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: > 05:2D:D2:47:DC:3C:36:D6:D6:06:75:FE:7A:E8:69:79:0B:E5:61:71 > > The ima-modsig entry for the same kernel module is: > > 10 82aa... ima-modsig > sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40 > 2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko > sha256:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 > 30818902818100ee96b264072a42888f78a2f9b8198467a3ad97d126f3d1cc1c24d23e7185cc743b04d4a54254ca16e1e11ed4450deb98b1f7bb4288424570fabcfc6d5aa93a2a14fa2b7835ac877cfea761e5ff414c6ee274eff26f8bd6c484312e56619299acf0dbd224b87c3883b66a9393d21af8962458663b0ac1706c63773cd50e8236270203010001 > > If the kernel module was signed by x509_ima.der certificate then > the public key entry in the ima-modsig should match the public key > for the key measurement for x509_ima.der. > > The above can be used to correlate the key measurement IMA entry, > ima-sig and ima-modsig entries using the same key. True, but associating the public key measurement with the file signature requires information from the certificate (e.g. issuer, serial number, and/or subject, subject keyid). For a regression test, it would be nice if the key measurement, itself, contained everything needed in order to validate the file signatures in the measurement list. Mimi
