On 11/12/2019 9:14 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Mon, 2019-11-11 at 14:29 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 11/11/19 11:23 AM, Patrick Callaghan wrote:
- if (rbuf_len == 0)
+ if (rbuf_len == 0) { /* unexpected EOF */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
break;
+ }
offset += rbuf_len;
Should there be an additional check to validate that (offset + rbuf_len)
is less than i_size before calling cypto_shash_update (since rbuf_len is
one of the parameters for this call)?
The "while" statement enforces that.
Mimi
Yes - but that check happens after the call to crypto_shash_update().
Perhaps integrity_kernel_read() will never return (rbuf_len) that will
=> violate the check in the "while" statement.
=> number of bytes read that is greater than the memory allocated for
rbuf even in error conditions.
Just making sure.
thanks,
-lakshmi
if ((rbuf_len == 0) || (offset + rbuf_len >= i_size)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
offset += rbuf_len;
rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, rbuf, rbuf_len);