On Wed, 2019-11-06 at 11:01 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> Asymmetric keys used for verifying file signatures or certificates
> are currently not included in the IMA measurement list.
>
> This patch defines a new IMA hook namely ima_post_key_create_or_update()
> to measure asymmetric keys.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index d7e987baf127..a0e233afe876 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -721,6 +721,22 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
> KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * ima_post_key_create_or_update - measure asymmetric keys
> + * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
> + * @key: created or updated key
> + * @flags: key flags
> + * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
> + *
> + * Keys can only be measured, not appraised.
> + */
> +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
> + unsigned long flags, bool create)
> +{
> + if ((keyring != NULL) && (key != NULL))
> + return;
I would move the patch that defines the "keyring=" policy option prior
to this one. Include the call to process_buffer_measurement() in this
patch. A subsequent patch would add support to defer measuring the
key, by calling a function named something like
ima_queue_key_measurement().
Mimi
> +}
> +
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> {
> int error;
