On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 02:16:20PM +0300, Janne Karhunen wrote: > On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jarkko Sakkinen > <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > get_random_bytes(). TPM could have a bug (making results predicatable), > > > > backdoor or even an inteposer in the bus. Salting gives protections > > > > against these concerns. > > > > > > The current issue in the randomness from my point of view is that > > > encrypted filesystems, ima etc in common deployments require high > > > quality entropy just few seconds after the system has powered on for > > > the first time. It is likely that people want to keep their keys > > > device specific, so the keys need to be generated on the first boot > > > before any of the filesystems mount. > > > > This patch does not have the described issue. > > My understanding was that you wanted to make the tpm_get_random() an > alternative to get_random_bytes(), and one reason why one might want > to do this is to work around the issues in get_random_bytes() in early > init as it may not be properly seeded. But sure, if you this wasn't > among the problems being solved then forget it. I'm trying to get a framework on how rng's should be used in the kernel. There doesn't seem to be one. /Jarkko
