Hi Nayna,
Nayna <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On 09/30/2019 09:04 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 000000000000..39401b67f19e
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
>>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>>> +/*
>>> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
>>> + * Author: Nayna Jain
>>> + */
>>> +
>>> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>>> +#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
>>> +
>>> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
>>> +{
>>> + return is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled();
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/* Defines IMA appraise rules for secureboot */
>>> +static const char *const arch_rules[] = {
>>> + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
>>> +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
>>> + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
>>> +#endif
>>> + NULL
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/*
>>> + * Returns the relevant IMA arch policies based on the system secureboot state.
>>> + */
>>> +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
>>> +{
>>> + if (is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled())
>>> + return arch_rules;
>>> +
>>> + return NULL;
>>> +}
>> If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is enabled but module signatures aren't enforced,
>> then IMA won't enforce module signature either. x86's
>> arch_get_ima_policy() calls set_module_sig_enforced(). Doesn't the
>> powerpc version need to do that as well?
>>
>> On the flip side, if module signatures are enforced by the module
>> subsystem then IMA will verify the signature a second time since there's
>> no sharing of signature verification results between the module
>> subsystem and IMA (this was observed by Mimi).
>>
>> IMHO this is a minor issue, since module loading isn't a hot path and
>> the duplicate work shouldn't impact anything. But it could be avoided by
>> having a NULL entry in arch_rules, which arch_get_ima_policy() would
>> dynamically update with the "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK" rule if
>> is_module_sig_enforced() is true.
>
> Thanks Thiago for reviewing. I am wondering that this will give two meanings
> for NULL.
What are the two meanings? My understanding is that it only means "end
of array". The additional NULL just allows arch_get_ima_policy() to
dynamically append one item to the array.
But I hadn't thought of your other alternatives. They should work just
as well. Among those, I think option 1 is cleaner.
This addresses the second issue I mentioned, but not the first.
Also, one other thing I just noticed is that x86's arch policy has
measure rules but powerpc's policy doesn't. What is different in our
case?
> Can we do something like below, there are possibly two options ?
>
> 1. Set IMA_APPRAISED in the iint->flags if is_module_sig_enforced().
>
> OR
>
> 2. Let ima_get_action() check for is_module_sig_enforced() when policy is
> appraise and func is MODULE_CHECK.
>
> Thanks & Regards,
> - Nayna
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
