On 2019-08-02 15:23:43, Tyler Hicks wrote: > On 2019-08-02 22:42:26, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 02, 2019 at 09:27:22AM -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote: > > > On 2019-08-02 10:21:16, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > On 8/1/2019 6:32 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 06:44:28PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > > > > According to the bug report at https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/62678, > > > > > > the trusted module is a dependency of the ecryptfs module. We should > > > > > > load the trusted module even if the TPM is inactive or deactivated. > > > > > > > > > > > > Given that commit 782779b60faa ("tpm: Actually fail on TPM errors during > > > > > > "get random"") changes the return code of tpm_get_random(), the patch > > > > > > should be modified to ignore the -EIO error. I will send a new version. > > > > > > > > > > Do you have information where this dependency comes from? > > > > > > > > ecryptfs retrieves the encryption key from encrypted keys (see > > > > ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key()). > > > > > > That has been there for many years with any problems. It was added > > > in 2011: > > > > > > commit 1252cc3b232e582e887623dc5f70979418caaaa2 > > > Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxx> > > > Date: Mon Jun 27 13:45:45 2011 +0200 > > > > > > eCryptfs: added support for the encrypted key type > > > > > > What's recently changed the situation is this patch: > > > > > > commit 240730437deb213a58915830884e1a99045624dc > > > Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > Date: Wed Feb 6 17:24:51 2019 +0100 > > > > > > KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip() > > > > > > Now eCryptfs has a hard dependency on a TPM chip that's working > > > as expected even if eCryptfs (or the rest of the system) isn't utilizing > > > the TPM. If the TPM behaves unexpectedly, you can't access your files. > > > We need to get this straightened out soon. > > > > I agree with this conclusion that eCryptfs needs to be fixed, not > > another workaround to trusted.ko. > > That wasn't the conclusion that I came to. I prefer Robert's proposed > change to trusted.ko. > > How do you propose that this be fixed in eCryptfs? > > Removing encrypted_key support from eCryptfs is the only way that I can > see to fix the bug in eCryptfs. That support has been there since 2011. > I'm not sure of the number of users that would be broken by removing > encrypted_key support. I don't think the number is high but I can't say > that confidently. AFAICT, this bug doesn't only affect eCryptfs. It also affects Intel nvdimm support starting with: commit 4c6926a23b76ea23403976290cd45a7a143f6500 Author: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Dec 6 12:40:01 2018 -0800 acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs So without a workaround in trusted.ko, encrypted_key support will need to be removed from eCryptfs and nvdimm to address this issue. Tyler > > Roberto, what was your use case when you added encrypted_key support to > eCryptfs back then? Are you aware of any users of eCryptfs + > encrypted_keys? > > Jarkko, removing a long-standing feature is potentially more disruptive > to users than adding a workaround to trusted.ko which already requires a > similar workaround. I don't think that I agree with you on the proper > fix here. > > Tyler > > > > > /Jarkko
