On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 13:00, Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski > <r.czerwinski@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs > > > earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with > > > actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code? > > > > AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be > > found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os > > Thanks, I will take a look. For documentation, refer to: https://optee.readthedocs.io/ > The fundamental problem with these things > is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be > done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2 > implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real > life. I agree with you regarding implementation specific nature of TEE but having a standardized client interface does solves the problem. > As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the > userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really > makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just > an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really > belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but > it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would > also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT > driver and the userland if needed. > > Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for > new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I > can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever > people think is the best. Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted". -Sumit > > > -- > Janne
