Re: [PATCH V2] IMA: Allow profiles to define the desired IMA template

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On 5/23/2019 8:18 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
Admins may wish to log different measurements using different IMA
templates. Add support for overriding the default template on a per-rule
basis.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

Rebased on next-integrity without relying on any other patches.

  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy  |  4 ++--
  security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  7 +++++--
  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  7 +++++--
  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  9 ++++++---
  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
  security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 15 +++++++++++----
  security/integrity/integrity.h        |  1 +
  8 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 74c6702de74e..e1a6996e4516 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ Description:
  				[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
  			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
  				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
-			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
-
+			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
  		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
  				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
  				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
@@ -38,6 +37,7 @@ Description:
  			fowner:= decimal value
  		lsm:  	are LSM specific
  		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
+			template:= name of an IMA template type (eg, d-ng)

IMA template name or custom format (if specified in the kernel command
line, see below).


  			pcr:= decimal value
default policy:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..fa4a807bae93 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void);
  void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
  void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
  struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
+struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
  int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
  int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
  int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
@@ -193,7 +194,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
/* LIM API function definitions */
  int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
  int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -214,7 +216,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
  int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
  void ima_init_policy(void);
  void ima_update_policy(void);
  void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..fce8f83c436c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
   *        MAY_APPEND)
   * @func: caller identifier
   * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
+ * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
   *
   * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
   *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -176,13 +177,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
   *
   */
  int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
  {
  	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
+				template_desc);
  }
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 5fb7127bbe68..2f6536ab69e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
  	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
-				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
+				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL);
  }
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 357edd140c09..f23069d9e43d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  {
  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
-	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
  	char *pathbuf = NULL;
  	char filename[NAME_MAX];
  	const char *pathname = NULL;
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
  	 * Included is the appraise submask.
  	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
+				&template_desc);
  	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
  			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
  	if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -275,7 +276,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  		goto out_locked;
  	}
- template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	if (!template_desc)
+		template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+
  	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
  		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
  		/* read 'security.ima' */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0f6fe53cef09..643490f9f0ad 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  		int type;	/* audit type */
  	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
  	char *fsname;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template;
  };
/*
@@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
   * @func: IMA hook identifier
   * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
   * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
+ * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
   *
   * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
   * conditions.
@@ -406,7 +408,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
   * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
   */
  int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
  {
  	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
  	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -438,6 +441,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
  		if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
  			*pcr = entry->pcr;
+ if (template_desc && entry->flags & IMA_TEMPLATE)
+			*template_desc = entry->template;
+

I would simply return the template, without checking the flags.


  		if (!actmask)
  			break;
  	}
@@ -676,7 +682,7 @@ enum {
  	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
  	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
  	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
-	Opt_pcr, Opt_err
+	Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_err
  };
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -710,6 +716,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
  	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
  	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
  	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
+	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
  	{Opt_err, NULL}
  };
@@ -763,6 +770,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  	char *from;
  	char *p;
  	bool uid_token;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
  	int result = 0;
ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -1058,6 +1066,16 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  			else
  				entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
+ break;
+		case Opt_template:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "template", args[0].from);

Please add:

if (entry->template)
	return -EINVAL;


+			template_desc = lookup_template_desc(args[0].from);

You assume that the template is already known, while users can specify
in the policy a combination of template fields that is not in the list.


+			if (!template_desc) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			} else {
+				entry->template = template_desc;
+				entry->flags |= IMA_TEMPLATE;
+			}
  			break;
  		case Opt_err:
  			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
@@ -1331,6 +1349,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
  			}
  		}
  	}
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_TEMPLATE)
+		seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
  	if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
  		seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
  	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index b631b8bc7624..34f23db2f985 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
  #define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
-static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
  static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
  				     const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
  				     int *num_fields);
@@ -108,16 +107,24 @@ static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
  }
  __setup("ima_template_fmt=", ima_template_fmt_setup);
-static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
+struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
  {
  	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
-	int found = 0;
+	int result, found = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
  	list_for_each_entry_rcu(template_desc, &defined_templates, list) {
  		if ((strcmp(template_desc->name, name) == 0) ||
  		    (strcmp(template_desc->fmt, name) == 0)) {
-			found = 1;
+			/*
+			 * template_desc_init_fields() will return immediately
+			 * if the template is already initialised
+			 */
+			result = template_desc_init_fields(template_desc->fmt,
+						 &(template_desc->fields),
+						 &(template_desc->num_fields));
+			if (!result)
+				found = 1;
  			break;
  		}
  	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7de59f44cba3..b3e3c58691ea 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
  #define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
  #define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG	0x08000000
  #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE		0x20000000

I think it is not necessary to define a new flag here. It should be
sufficient to check entry->template.

Roberto


  #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
  				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)


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