On 5/14/19 2:18 PM, James Bottomley wrote: >> I think Rob is right here. If /init was statically built into the >> kernel image, it has no more ability to compromise the kernel than >> anything else in the kernel. What's the problem here? > > The specific problem is that unless you own the kernel signing key, > which is really untrue for most distribution consumers because the > distro owns the key, you cannot build the initrd statically into the > kernel. You can take the distro signed kernel, link it with the initrd > then resign the combination with your key, provided you insert your key > into the MoK variables as a trusted secure boot key, but the distros > have been unhappy recommending this as standard practice. > > If our model for security is going to be to link the kernel and the > initrd statically to give signature protection over the aggregate then > we need to figure out how to execute this via the distros. If we > accept that the split model, where the distro owns and signs the kernel > but the machine owner builds and is responsible for the initrd, then we > need to explore split security models like this proposal. You can have a built-in and an external initrd? The second extracts over the first? (I know because once upon a time conflicting files would append. It sounds like the desired behavior here is O_EXCL fail and move on.) Rob
